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The Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, once posited that war is “politics 
by other means.” In Clausewitz’s traditional notion of war, political considerations must 
always lead military ones except in the case of a fight for survival. He also asserted that 
policy-making in wartime works best when military considerations are fully incorporated 
with the political, thereby producing a seamless policy.  
In the years immediately following the Second World War, peace again prevailed.  
The architects of American foreign policy in the State Department therefore did not pay 
much heed to the military aspects of policy. Those tasked with evaluating the military 
aspects of policy, the Department of Defense planning staffs, largely deferred to their 
counterparts at the State Department. In the case of Franco’s Spain, much antipathy existed 
among the New Dealers of the State Department against his regime. Although they did not 
adopt an openly hostile stance, they pursued a policy of benign neglect toward Spain for a 
period of nearly five years. This policy ignored both important military and political 
aspects.   
Historians such as Boris Liedtke assert that the military interests of the Department 
of Defense planners subordinated political considerations when the United States finally 
established relations with Franco’s Spain in the Pact of Madrid of 1953. This thesis will 
display that disequilibrium existed in American foreign policy toward Spain between 1945-
1953 since the State Department ignored the Spanish question. The President then 
delegated negotiating authority to the Defense Department planners so that they could 
form a cohesive Spanish policy. The distinguishing factor of the Spanish negotiations was 
simply that they occurred under the aegis of military instead of civil authority. It will be 
shown that, in the case of Spain, military considerations did not supersede political ones, 
for they functioned in concert as Clausewitz originally put forward. 
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Section I: Clausewitz in the Cold War 
 
“The only question, therefore, is whether in framing plans for a War the political point of view 
should give way to the purely military (if such a point were conceivable), that is to say, should 
disappear altogether, or subordinate itself to it, or whether the political is to remain the ruling 
point of view and the military to be considered subordinate to it.”1   
 —Carl von Clausewitz  
 
The New Principles of War 
 
On his visit to Madrid a week after the signing of the Pact of Madrid that established the 
Spanish-American military alliance of September 1953, New York Times correspondent Cyrus 
Sulzberger commented on the “energetic, pushing, rather nice chap” who lead the American 
military mission there, Major General August Kissner of the United States Air Force.2 With his 
“typical Air Force mentality”, the General disregarded the moral issues behind the Spanish-
American alliance. 3 In this, he seemed to represent a new era of the Defense Department. After 
the civil authority neglected to form a cohesive foreign policy in respect to Spain, Congress and 
President Truman eventually designated Kissner’s military mission to negotiate bilateral 
relations with the government of Spain. Settling on the construction of four American military 
bases on Spanish soil, the Pact of Madrid allowed the United States to provide great sums of 
foreign aid to Spain under a military aegis. This amounted to the first time the Defense 
Department had exercised so much authority on the formation of American foreign policy. It left 
in its wake a troubled legacy as the Defense Department planning staffs took on a more 
permanent role in crafting foreign policy recommendations. 
                                                        
1 Carl von Clausewitz. On War. “Vom Kriege” originally published in 1832. Edited by Anatol 
Rapoport. (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 404 
2 C. L Sulzberger. A Long Row of Candles. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1969.) 
Pp. 897 
3 Ibid, pp 897. 
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Despite its many peculiarities surrounding the involvement of the American military, the 
Spanish case did not constitute so radical a departure from the standard formation of foreign 
policy in wartime as its critics would believe. Several factors distinguished the Spanish Question 
from other Cold War cases. Generalissimo Franco rode into power on the coattails of Continental 
fascism during the bloody Spanish Civil War from 1936 to1939. Battered and exhausted, 
Franco’s Spain did not join the Axis during the Second World War, though it maintained with 
the United States an official status of “non-belligerency”, and later in the war, of neutrality. By 
war’s end, Franco represented the vestige of a defeated ideology but somehow had managed to 
emerge on the other side of the war firmly in command of Spain. Ethically, Spain would make 
for an intolerable ally and should be excluded from such bodies as the United Nations. Yet as the 
need for foreign markets and the strategic contours of the Cold War determined, Spain could also 
serve a vital role in the community of Western nations. What to do with Spain remained an 
unresolved issue. The Spanish Question lingered in the public debate, as personal rivalries, petty 
grievances, and lack of bureaucratic coordination lent it an air of obscurity—as one Secretary of 
the Air Force called it “a separate stairway”.4 Yet this was illusory in nature. As this thesis will 
analyze, any deviance from a standard wartime policy along the lines Clausewitz originally put 
forward in On War emanated from the failures of those agents involved rather than any from any 
structural shortcomings. In the formation of an American policy towards Spain, the “political” 
and the “military” functioned as complementary units of an overall objective. 
By the time American planners began crafting a solution to the Spanish question in 1949, 
the Cold War was already underway. The return to traditional foreign policy formation in the 
years following the Second World War sometimes left important strategic concerns unheeded. In 
                                                        
4 Theodore J. Lowi. Bases in Spain. Inter-University Case Program, #101. (New York: Published for 
the ICP by the Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963). pp. 1. 
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this light, the seminal lessons of war originally put forward by the 19th century theorist, Carl von 
Clausewitz, take on a modern relevance. In his estimation, policy worked best in wartime when 
the “political” led the “military”, or if the two complemented one another. This thesis intends to 
prove that, in a similar vein, the events leading to the signing of the Pact of Madrid in 1953 
displayed that political and military considerations functioned in concert—without the 
predominance of one over the other. 
The Military-Industrial Complex 
 
Military aid during the decade of the 1950s exhibited the extent to which military 
considerations took root in Cold War America. When President Eisenhower addressed the nation 
a final time as President, he examined the extent of a new American phenomenon, the “military-
industrial complex”.5 Its role, Eisenhower argued, safeguarded American strategic interests from 
Soviet subversion but conditioned a bellicose response from the people, “The total influence—
economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the 
Federal government.”6 Safety came with a price, one that Eisenhower indentified as an 
increasing lack of civilian control over the military. A frequent outlet of defense production 
eventually presented itself as American foreign aid during the 1950s. Although the Marshall Plan 
fostered the development of a renewed community of interests in Europe, the Military Assistance 
Program and Mutual Security Program, to much less fanfare, extended foreign aid credits in the 
procurement of military equipment for America’s allies. By 1951, nearly seventy percent of all 
American foreign aid fell under the category of “Military Assistance”, rising from twenty-six 
                                                        
5 President Eisenhower. “Farewell Address to the Nation, 1/17/61”. The Avalon Project. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp. (accessed 2/12/10) 
6 Ibid 
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percent just one year earlier—an increase of $2 billion.7 The sums designated to military aid also 
increased.  Over the decade of the 1950s, military assistance in its various forms comprised fifty-
eight percent of all American foreign aid.8 Although all the foreign policy agencies of the 
government had a hand in forming policy recommendations, it was increasingly the task of the 
Department of Defense and its policy planning staffs to determine where military aid should go 
and in what quantities. 
Historiography 
 
The issue of American militarism—or the Military Industrial Complex—then took on a 
special significance in the academic community. Seeking to identify the first intrusions of this 
omnipresent and seemingly monolithic organization on American foreign policy, scholars looked 
to different points of origination from the early Cold War. The Spanish case seemed promising—
for the military men of the Defense Department established relations with Spain in the Pact of 
Madrid of 1953, a nation that had been previously excluded from the global community of 
nations.  
Theodore Lowi’s study Bases in Spain may be one of the first on the topic in 1963, yet it 
captured the bureaucratic motion that propelled the planning staffs of the Defense Department to 
the fore in constructing a Spanish policy.9 Lacking many of the benefits of declassified archives, 
Lowi remained somewhat uneasy about indicating who, in his estimation, won out: the political 
or the military. Although he briefly mentioned the matter, he refrained from examining it in full.  
                                                        
7 Adam Yarmolinsky. The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society. (New York: 
Harper & Rowe, 1971). pp. 114. 
8 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, 1968, Vol. III, pp 3972.  
9 Theodore J. Lowi. Bases in Spain. Inter-University Case Program, #101. (New York: Published for 
the ICP by the Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963). pp. 2. 
  Mendoza 8 
Boris Liedtke asserted in his most recent study of 1998, Embracing a Dictatorship, that 
the “the US willingness to compromise” in granting Spanish demands late in the diplomatic 
process revealed the militaristic bent of the Defense Department generals in executing the 
Spanish policy.10 Military considerations, then, subordinated political ones. He stated this in no 
uncertain terms, “Military considerations had clearly overruled America’s democratic and liberal 
convictions.”11  
This interpretation, however, treats political considerations separately from military ones. 
In this new state of cold war, these interests could not be so easily divorced. Those who 
promoted defense interests did so with the understanding that it was an expedient and less 
apparent means of putting forward a cohesive Spanish policy—a policy that adequately 
examined political, ideological, and social considerations. Early ideas for Spanish integration, as 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff originally put forward, gave due consideration to political implications 
in a rather even-handed manner. These proposals met resistance from the State Department and 
President Truman—who interpreted political considerations through the narrow lens of ideology. 
This perspective omitted strategic, economic, and humanitarian concerns in the process. As a 
means of bringing about a swift resolution to the Spanish question, several Congressmen and 
thought-leaders re-inserted the language of defense back into the debate. After several legislative 
defeats, Truman acquiesced in the base agreements and placed blame upon the “military men” of 
the Pentagon.12 The decision in Washington to pursue the base agreements emerged as the 
compromise of a long and complicated political process. There were no clear winners, since the 
prestige of all suffered in the process. 
                                                        
10 Boris Liedtke. Embracing a Dictatorship. (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc, 1998), pp. 4. 
11 Ibid, pp. 213. 
12 Liedkte, pp. 91, 106. 
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Method 
Historians have long attempted to insert, adapt, or read the seminal text of On War by 
Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian theorist of political realism, into the history of the Cold War. 
Azar Gat, correctly exposed modern American interpretations as creating an artificial “Marxist 
‘Clausewitz connection’”13. Several inconsistencies emerge from the outset. Namely, the topos 
of war had seemingly changed. Nuclear weapons seemingly rendered conventional methods 
obsolete. Yet this change occurred in appearance only. This thesis does not seek to prove 
Clausewitz correct or to hold On War as a categorical standard. Rather, understanding how the 
“military” and “political” relate to one another in the construction of policy—the language of 
politics—provides a sound thematic basis for analyzing the Spanish question.  
This thesis seeks to examine the Spanish question and the complex interactions of its 
many actors in order to display how the military and political were complimentary rather than 
competitive aspects of policy formulation. These were traits that Clausewitz first identified as 
national policy in planning for a war—a description that best captures how the Spanish-
American base agreements emerged. To better understand the relation of the political to the 
military in the early years of the Cold War, this thesis recognizes four discreet periods.  
The first—the policy vacuum of 1945-1949—emerged as the planning staffs of the 
Defense Department maintained little organization and thus could not form cohesive policy 
recommendations spanning the interests of all the military branches. Yet their early experience is 
telling. Not only did they take into account political, economic, and a host of other 
considerations into their policy goals, they deferred to the civil authority to make such 
judgments. Meanwhile, the majority of the State Department policy staff remained hostile to 
                                                        
13 Azar Gat, “Clausewitz and the Marxists: Yet Another Look”. Journal of Contemporary History. 
Published by Sage Publications.  Vol. 27, No. 2 (Apr., 1992), pp. 363-382, JSTOR (accessed 1/10/10), 
pp. 363. 
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Franco’s Spain influencing what can broadly be described as their political considerations. The 
subsequent prolonging of a definitive policy created a vacuum from 1945 to 1949 in which 
shortsighted political objectives took precedence over long-term political and strategic 
objectives.  
The second period, the ascendance of the political “Junketeers” on Capitol Hill from 
1949 to 1950, began as American political leaders recognized the need to establish diplomatic 
relations with Spain and the infeasibility of simply ignoring the problem.14 Senator McCarran, a 
vehemently pro-Catholic and anti-Communist Senator from Nevada and the former American 
ambassador to Spain, Carlton Hayes, appropriated the language of defense as an important 
component to their overall objective of Spanish inclusion. They formed what became known as 
the “Spanish Lobby” a group of political, business, and religious interests that actively promoted 
the cause of the Spain in Congress.15 
In the third period, the success of the efforts of the Spanish Lobby revealed the 
intransigence of President Truman and formerly of Secretary of State Acheson, sparking a 
radicalization of all parties involved followed by a headlong rush toward forming a Spanish 
policy. Although Acheson reversed his stance on the Spanish situation, President Truman held-
up the legislative process that could have otherwise bestowed upon Spain greater allotments of 
economic aid. Despite the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and eventually the State 
Department itself that Franco was in Spain to stay, President Truman could not bring himself to 
tolerate him at any level. As a matter of priority, the immediate aid Congress allotted to Spain 
was for the construction of military bases that the Spaniards would then lease out to the 
Americans.  
                                                        
14 Lowi, Bases in Spain. pp. 11. 
15 Liedtke, Embracing a Dictatorship. pp. 59.   
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Finally, the fourth period saw the convergence of military and political interests into a 
single instrument of policy that the Department of Defense, through its arbitrators on the ground, 
ultimately crafted: The Spanish-American Pact of Madrid in 1953. From its earlier, more 
fragmented days, the Defense Department generals proved capable of executing the policy. They 
did so based upon the coordination of a number of ad hoc committees created for that purpose. 
This revealed how the earlier postponements had hindered the identification and implementation 
of valid political objectives. What emerged was nothing short of the full expression of national 
political interests over purely military ones. 
The Characters  
 
Between retirements, transfers, promotions, elections, and untimely deaths, the face of 
the diplomatic and defense establishments changed greatly from 1945 to 1954. In tracing the 
history of the relations between Spain and the United States in the eight years following the 
Second World War, some figures appear in multiple sections—George Marshall served as 
Chairman of Army, Secretary of State, and finally as Secretary of Defense during the period of 
study. Others, like Jaume Miravittles, appear only for an instance. Some of these figures acted as 
forces of stimulation to better adhere military to political considerations in foreign policy 
planning while the rest represented forces of restraint. Yet they all served important roles in 
defining the conditions under which Western defense planning was conceived in Spain.  
In the years of the policy vacuum from 1945 to 1949, several inter-branch military 
committees emerged as the prime engines of coordination among the armed forces. By the 
conclusion of the Second World War, they answered to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Secretaries of War/Navy. During the period of study, they gradually gained more autonomy, 
answering directly to the Secretary of Defense and his Secretariat. Originally intended to 
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facilitate coordination with the Allies in terms of educing strategic scenarios, the Joint War Plans 
Committee and its subordinate Joint Strategic Survey Committee grew to be comprised of 
influential “three flag” general staff officers by the end of the Second World War.16 After the 
establishment of the National Military Establishment in 1947—the predecessor of the modern 
Department of Defense—this committee evolved to become the Joint Strategic Plans Group. The 
JSPG among the rest of the planning committees imagined future combat scenarios and 
suggested the means the Defense Department should employ to meet potential threats. The Joint 
Intelligence Committee/Staff also was responsible for long-range scenarios.17 Other influential 
planning committees included the Joint Staff Planners and the Joint Logistics Committee. The 
Joint Staff Planners served as the most senior planners of their respective military branches. The 
Joint Logistics Committee examined the approximate needs of the military in both men and 
material to bring any proposed policies to fruition. Finally, the Joint Intelligence Committee 
compiled analyses of the current military knowledge for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Over the 
course of the period in study, the committees slightly changed names as the agency underwent a 
series of reorganizations.  
At the same time, the Catalan Jaume Miravittles appeared at the Directorate of Spanish 
Information for the State Department with a scathing report against the voices in the National 
Military Establishment and elsewhere that contemplated some sort of military alliance with 
Franco’s Spain. This report circulated to the White House and to the National Military 
Establishment in 1948 to remind planners south of the Potomac to hold fast to the line of Spanish 
exclusion. Miravittles had good reason for his strong opinions. He was a progressive and sided 
                                                        
16 James F. Schnabel History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy. 
Vol. 1 1945-1947. (Office of Joint History, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 1996). pp. 4. 
17 Kenneth W. Condit. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National 
Policy. Vol. II: 1947-1949. (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, Inc). viii. 
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on the political left in Spanish politics. More specifically, he was a Catalan nationalist and a 
member of a separatist political party known as the Esquerra.18 Along with his friend, the 
Catalan historian Companys, the two consistently wrote policies for the flagging republic out of 
Barcelona. Eventually, the Nationalist victory prompted the two to go into exile. While 
organizing exiled Catalans in Vichy France during the Second World War, German authorities 
caught-up with Companys. The Germans deported him to Spain, where he was swiftly tried and 
executed.19 
After James Forrestal began to falter as the Secretary of Defense, President Truman 
brought in Louis Johnson. His ongoing fight with Secretary of State Acheson over military 
preparedness revealed the extent to which personal rivalries hindered the needs of American 
foreign policy—forcing it through channels it may not have gone otherwise. Originally a New 
Dealer, Johnson left the War Department in 1940 after President Roosevelt asked Johnson to step 
down.20 Roosevelt thought it prudent to bring more Republicans into his administration on the 
brink of war. As a Washington outsider born in Western Virginia to a grocer, Louis Johnson 
possessed a populist connection to the people that few else in Washington could display. 
Roosevelt valued Johnson for his rough-and-tumble style and frequently promised Johnson the 
post of Secretary of War when it should become available.21 Johnson, a former heavyweight-
boxing champion during his college days at the University of Virginia, spent three years fighting 
his way up the War Department to be its Assistant Secretary. Due to the political necessities at 
                                                        
18 Ronald Radosh, Mary R. Habeck and Grigory Sevostianov. Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union in the 
Spanish Civil War, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).  pp. 117. 
19 Ibid, pp. 117. 
20 Keith D. McFarland and David L. Roll. Louis Johnson and the arming of America: The Roosevelt and 
Truman years. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). pp. 35. 
21 Ibid, pp. 101. 
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the time, Johnson had to go.22 In 1948, Johnson earned the recognition of President Truman, 
raising campaign funds and improving Truman’s political standing among veterans during a 
contentious primary battle.23 Upon his arrival at Defense, he promised to make changes—to lead 
from the top of the reporting structure. On the issue of Spanish integration, Johnson held a 
different view than the President though he deferred to the interests of the State Department 
regularly.  
In the second section, several figures appear who attempted to insert Spain back into the 
foreign policy dialogue of the late 1940s. The most prominent of these were Carlton Hayes, the 
former United States Ambassador to Spain and Seth Low Professor of History at Columbia 
University, and Senator Patrick McCarran, one the great firebrands of the Senate in the 1940s 
and 1950s. A frequent target of those who supported the creation of a Spanish policy was 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson. His counterpart at the Department of Defense, Louis Johnson 
largely followed the political line of the Truman administration, but in the last instance, 
demurred concerning the administration’s lack of concern of military considerations in the 
formation of foreign policy in Spain. Some others made an appearance, but only briefly. A 
notable trait of these other fringe political figures who called for a pro-Spanish policy was that 
they ascribed to the platform of the so-called “Spanish Lobby”— group of businessmen, 
politicians, and Catholic clergy who desired the resumption of full diplomatic relations between 
Spain and the United States.24    
From a quiet, upstate New York town, Carlton Hayes came to Columbia College in 1900 
and continued his graduate studies in history under the tutelage of Charles Beard, earning his 
                                                        
22 McFarland, pp. 101. 
23 Ibid, pp. 135, pp. 137 
24 Lowi, pp. 2 
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Ph.D. in 1909 at the age of twenty-eight.25 Hayes served as the United States Ambassador to 
Spain starting in 1942 for the duration of the Second World War. During Congressional hearings 
for the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, references to “Columbia University’s history 
professor” Carlton Hayes appeared. 26 Hayes was no stranger to the defense community. Between 
graduating from Columbia College in 1904 and rising to full professorship by 1919, Hayes 
served as an intelligence office with the General Staff of the Army during the First World War.27 
He converted to Roman Catholicism after his own graduate studies convinced him of the 
existence of universal historical truths—such as economic justifications for history, which his 
biographer described as “socialistic”.28 Yet over his academic career, his reviews were mixed 
with others questioning Hayes’ liberal credentials.29 President Roosevelt tapped Hayes to be the 
Ambassador to Spain in 1942 inviting criticism from the political left on account of Hayes’ overt 
position that the United States draw Spain away from the Axis by recognizing Franco’s regime. 
Senator McCarran was raised in austerity. Born to Irish immigrant parents who raised 
livestock on the barren Nevada wastelands, McCarran’s Catholic faith held an especially central 
role in his personal development.30 Despite early political success in Nevada state politics, 
McCarran opted to abandon the livestock business and move out of the Reno area altogether to 
the mining towns that were springing up further to the south in places like Tonopah and 
Goldfield. There, he made a name for himself as a talented defense attorney who gained a 
                                                        
25 Carlton J.H. Hayes, “Untitled Autobiography”. Box 8, Chapter 2, pp. 1. The Personal Papers of 
Carlton Hayes. 
26 Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, vol 96, no 5 May 10. pp. 3964. 
27 Earl Edmondson, “Carlton J. Hayes” American Dictionary of National Biography. (accessed 
1/15/10). 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid. 
30 Jerome Edwards. Pat McCarran: Political boss of Nevada. (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 
1982), pp. 2. 
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reputation for his “emotional oratory” for the common man, the lowly “sinner”.31 McCarran 
possessed immense populist appeal. During the 1906-7 Goldfield strike, McCarran sided with the 
IWW and the miners—denouncing the current Nevada governor and thus limiting his immediate 
political in the process. Yet McCarran was also a politician of the times. Upon his election to the 
Senate in 1932, he attached himself to the tenets of the New Deal, ensuring that “contentment 
may come to the masses of the people and that the forgotten man shall be kept constantly in 
mind.”32 He later broke with the New Deal during the Truman era. During the early years of the 
Cold War, as his Senatorial power waned, he grew increasingly fraught at the thought of 
Communist subversives working in the federal government. Above all else, McCarran was a 
strong Catholic. He even called upon the Vatican during the Second World War in an attempt to 
secure the release of Joseph McDonald, the son of family friend who was stationed on Wake 
Island during the Japanese invasion of 1942 and subsequently taken prisoner.33  
 At this point, Secretary Acheson did not support Spanish inclusion. Born as the son of a 
preacher and living in Middletown, Connecticut, Acheson grew-up in an upper middle class 
setting. He then was educated at the Groton School alongside future New Dealers whom we 
could count as his friends. Among these, Acheson developed a particularly strong friendship 
with W. Averell Harriman, the future shipping magnate, diplomat, and politician.34 After going 
on to Yale and Harvard Law School, Acheson distinguished himself as an international lawyer 
before clerking for Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in 1919.35 Although Acheson 
supported the Roosevelt Administration as Under Secretary of the Treasury in 1933, he fell out 
                                                        
31 Jerome Edwards, pp. 17, 8. 
32 Reno Evening Gazette, Nov. 9 1932 in Edwards, Pat McCarran. pp. 48.  
33 Ibid, pp. 124 
34 Robert L. Beisner. Dean Acheson: A life in the Cold War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006), pp. 8. 
35 Ibid, pp. 10. 
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with Roosevelt over his stance on the President’s currency inflation scheme and resigned.36 One 
of the original architects of America’s Cold War foreign policy, Acheson rejoined the Roosevelt 
Administration in the State Department during the Second World War and rose to be its 
Secretary under the Truman Administration in 1949. Early during his tenure at the State 
Department, his “Eurocentric” tendencies began to show forth.37 Over this and a variety of other 
issues, he would clash with the Secretary of Defense from 1949-1950, Louis Johnson. 
In the third section, the Defense Department begins to take initiative in forming 
American foreign policy since several years of inaction exposed breadth of American political 
and military considerations by securing an allied Spain. At this point, most of American interests 
in Spain fell into the category of the strategic. As such, President Truman delegated policy-
making authority to the Defense planners. President Truman pursued such a plan for efficiency 
and to assuage administration critics who thought Truman was bungling the Korean War effort. 
Secretary Acheson took on a more proactive role in forming a cohesive Spanish policy alongside 
the new Secretaries of Defense, George Marshall followed by Robert Lovett. As a disconnect 
appeared between the political and military authorities following the Korean crisis of June 1950, 
much criticism against the Truman administration surfaced. Moreover, most of this criticism was 
levied at Secretary Johnson at the Defense Department and at Secretary Acheson.  
After Secretary Johnson left the Truman administration, Acheson alone suffered the brunt 
of attacks from administration critics on account his Eurocentrism that ignored other areas of the 
world. Among the critics, Senator McCarran was prominent. He even brought Acheson before 
his Senate Internal Security Subcommittee—originally designed to root out accused Communists 
                                                        
36 Beisner, pp. 13. 
37 Ibid, pp. 512, 14. 
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from the federal government—on account of his perceived incompetence in late 1952.38 
Although Acheson survived politically until the change of administrations in 1953, his previous 
reluctance to rearm West Germany, to integrate Spain, and to place more emphasis in Far 
Eastern affairs hampered any strong stances he might have maintained. For the rest of his tenure 
as Secretary of State, Acheson kept a low profile. 
In the fourth section, Robert Lovett succeeded George Marshall as Secretary of Defense 
in 1951—a period during which the Defense Department pursued bilateral relations with Spain 
along the lines that Congress and the President had designated. After Louis Johnson left the 
Department of Defense, President Truman called George Marshall, the former Secretary of State 
and renowned General of the Army from the Second World War, out of retirement to serve as the 
agency’s Secretary.39 Although the National Security Act of 1947 prohibited anyone who 
received a military commission in the prior ten years from serving as Secretary of Defense, 
Congress exempted Marshall.40 During this period, the Korean War demanded much of 
Marshall’s policy initiative and he did not play a specific role in crafting a Spanish policy. Yet 
Secretary Marshall would retire from public life after a year as Defense Secretary. 
Finally, Robert Lovett appeared as Secretary of Defense in 1951 until the end of the 
Truman administration. Lovett managed the Defense Department’s improved policy role by 
continuing the agency’s internal reorganizations that his predecessors began. Lovett was also a 
close friend of Averell Harriman dating back to their childhood, and more recently, as alumni of 
the Skull and Bones Society of Yale.41 Before completing his degree at Yale, Lovett served as a 
naval pilot in the First World War alongside the Yale Flying Unit, a group of ambitious 
                                                        
38 Beisner, pp. 52. 
39 Walter Isaacson, The Wise Men: Six friends and the world they made. (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1986), pp. 213. 
40 Robert Borklund. Men of the Pentagon. [Praeger: New York, 1966], pp. 101. 
41 Isaacson, The Wise Men. pp. 21. 
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undergraduates-turned-aviators.42 Lovett met General Marshall during the Second World War 
when Lovett was the Assistant Secretary of War for Air.43 In this role, he earned the esteem of 
Marshall. After the Second World War, Marshall called on Lovett from Brown Brothers 
Harriman to serve as his Under Secretary in 1949.44 Lovett was also on good terms with Acheson 
through their respective social circles.  
Along with these figures others made important contributions though they did not 
necessarily give much regard to Franco or Spain in particular. Others in the military like General 
Omar Bradley, and a series of Joint Chiefs of Staff also played central roles in the Spanish 
negotiations, yet they responded to the policy imperatives of the civil authority. The integration 
of Spain was a complex situation, for it relied on many different agencies and a confluence of 
peculiar circumstances.  
 
Section II: The Policy Vacuum  
 
The Early Years 
 
Between 1945 and 1949, military considerations did not dominate political ones. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and their subalterns eventually revealed their more circumspect conceptions 
of political interests in their future war scenarios. Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff displayed an 
unwillingness and inability to broach the Spanish question, thus limiting the scope of military 
interests—leaving the civil authority to determine the course of the Spanish policy. Three factors 
hindered the Defense Department’s potential in pursuing the Spanish question in conjunction 
with other federal agencies: initially, the fragmentary nature of military oversight precluded any 
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agency-wide initiatives or agreement on policy; the war planners of the defense committees did 
not put much importance into placing American military resources in Spain; finally, the 
competition between the branches of the military again limited the scope of the agency’s 
authority. Although some at the State Department called for a new approach instead of the 
diplomatic non-recognition of Spain, a strong countercurrent emerged that identified political 
considerations solely upon an ideological basis. A period of indecision ensued producing a 
vacuum in policy. With this in mind, the sudden turn of Spanish-American relations in the early 
1950s eventually put forward many of the policy ideas that first originated from the Defense 
planners. 
 “A Loose Confederation of Independent Fiefdoms” 
 
The early components of the Defense Department exhibit a lack of coordination 
extending across all the branches on both the civil and military structures. Adam Yarmolinsky, 
who chronicled the rise of the Defense Department in such works as The Military Establishment, 
conceded that by the 1970s, the DoD had grown too big for its own good, “The flexibility needed 
to deal with new threats is compromised by the dead weight of established force structures.”45 
Yet earlier in it history, the agency displayed a great amount of operational flexibility, “The 
military establishment as an organization is usually visualized as a monolith, but in reality it is 
more like a modern structure of prestressed concrete held together by the tensions of opposite 
forces.”46 This adaptability emerged from the early days of the National Military Establishment 
as petty rivalries merged with the ad hoc needs of the institution,  “From 1947 to 1961, the 
Department of Defense was a loose confederation of independent fiefdoms, uneasily presided 
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over by the Secretary of Defense.”47 “Fiefdoms” can rarely function in concert, and even more 
sparingly refrain from fighting amongst themselves. In this light, the reports of the Defense 
planners served as weak recommendations to the actual decision makers in the State Department. 
Despite their efficient management of the American war machine during the Second 
World War, the Joint Chiefs lacked the organization during the immediate postwar years to gain 
appreciable influence in foreign policy formation. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War 
Secretaries were the architects of the military recommendations that informed policy decisions, 
their absence on account of administrative issues exposed a lack of attention of military 
considerations in policy formation. The military thus functioned as subsidiaries of the political.  
With the development of a permanent military establishment in the postwar years, the 
need to establish bases abroad in the defeated axis nations now occupied an uncomfortable locus 
between the military and civilian authority. Chief of Staff of the Army, General George 
Marshall, called for clarification of the military’s future role, particularly about developing 
American bases abroad in JCS 1496 “United States Military Policy.”48 In Marshall’s estimation, 
global military commitments were quickly becoming a matter of policy. 
Then Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew swiftly responded through the State-War-
Navy Coordinating Committee. He indicated the need to comply with new, international 
framework, “It [JCS 1496] also ignores the need for making clear that our military policy must 
conform with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to employ force only under 
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conditions there stipulated.”49 Ostensibly, this directly ruled out Spain. If there were any 
ambiguity as to American intentions to Spain, the Tripartite Declaration of March 1946 between 
the United Kingdom, France, and the United States removed it:  
“It is agreed that so long as General Franco continues in control of Spain the Spanish people 
cannot anticipate full and cordial association with those nations of the world which have, by 
common effort, brought defeat to German Nazism and Italian Fascism, which aided the present 
Spanish regime in its rise to power and after which the regime was patterned.”50 
 
The civil authority was firmly in control of the Spanish question. By December 1946, they had 
also voted on the UN Resolution to remove all ambassadors of member nations from Spain.51 
Nonetheless, the State Department pledged to keep abreast of strategic developments. They 
committed to forwarding a cohesive policy that took into account military issues, “It is the view 
of the Department of State that the maximum degree of security can be obtained only if our 
foreign policy and our military policy are mutually helpful.”52 It was their hope going forward 
that both would be given due consideration since it appeared that a permanent and global 
military presence would have a great bearing on American foreign relations. As the National 
Military Establishment took shape, Spain attracted the interest of the policy planners of the 
defense community. 
Scenarios of War 
 
Although they lacked the organization to pursue their policy recommendations, the 
planning staffs of the early Defense Department did not ignore political considerations. The 
method by which they arrived at their recommendations involved the analysis of a great number 
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of factors—not all of which pertained directly to military action. These recommendations did not 
always favor Spanish inclusion, though they did call for a different approach to the Spanish 
question. They did this by writing recommendations based upon future conflicts with the Soviet 
Union. Under what circumstances would strategic interests lead the United States to ally itself 
with another nation? How would political considerations affect the willingness of the United 
States to make allegiances during peacetime? By 1949, the military planners of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff addressed these questions and more. They had come to understand the political while 
their civilian counterparts did not understand the military. 
The strategic importance of Spain first appeared to the National Military Establishment 
only as a stopgap against a potential Soviet invasion of Western Europe in its future war 
scenarios. These did not entail the commitment of the American defense establishment to Spain 
since they precluded American involvement in Iberia unless war broke out. After all, it was a 
general hope that the United Nations could offer some security against foreign intervention 
through small-scale and sustained action.53 The Joint War Plans Committee first compiled future 
war scenarios in April 1946. Its successor organization, the Joint Logistics Plans Committee, and 
its subsidiaries, the Joint Intelligence Committee and Joint Logistics Plans Group, followed suit. 
The future scenarios of the Joint Chiefs, PINCHER, DRUMBEAT, BROILER, and 
BUSHWACKER, all dealt with Spain at some level. Most were pessimistic about American 
prospects in Europe. Some of these reports dealt with the Spanish situation only in passing while 
others focused more specifically on Spain. The lack of intra-department consensus and the 
factionalism between the military branches detracted from the potential policy influence of these 
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war scenarios. Yet their conception of Spain, in some cases, interpreted political considerations 
in a more nuanced manner than did their counterparts across the Potomac. 
The Pyrenees initially appeared to the military planners as bridge-too-far, but as they 
recognized the sheer mass of the Soviet and Eastern bloc militaries that had not yet departed 
Eastern Europe, circumstance forced them to consider the possibility of further Soviet expansion. 
Comprised of former intelligence and logistics officers of the Joint Post War Committee who 
now had more time, the Joint Intelligence Staff and the Joint War Plans Committee set to work 
preparing for future conflicts.54 Early reports from late 1945 to March 1946 frankly admitted the 
unfavorable gap of conventional forces that existed between the United States and the Soviet 
Union—with nearly three hundred divisions a few hundred miles from the heart of Western 
Europe counting those of the Eastern bloc nations.55 In their calculus, the JWPC determined that, 
with the current Soviet presence in Europe, the Soviet military could conquer Europe as the 
opening phase of a larger operation to take the Middle East.56 They estimated that there would be 
a “stiff price” to pay once the Soviets reached the Pyrenees.57 As a line of defense against a 
Continental European invasion by the Soviets, the Pyrenees attracted some attention in defense 
circles as early as 1946. 
From recognizing the vulnerabilities of the Western defense matrix, the Defense 
committees then anticipated their alternatives that, in most cases, did not involve direct 
commitments to Spain. The Joint War Plans Committee wrote the first strategic scenario reports 
for the Joint Planning Committee in the form of PINCHER—regarding the outbreak of war with 
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the Soviet Union within the next few years on April 27, 1946.58 This report served as the basis 
for other such global scenarios such as CALDRON, COCKSPUR, MOONRISE, and most 
importantly for Spain, DRUMBEAT, which was subtitled “The Soviet Threat Against the Iberian 
Peninsula and the Means Required to Meet It.”59 As policy planners, it was their responsibility to 
plan hypothetical responses, which required a greater understanding of the political. In the 
unlikely event that the likely Soviet enemy attacked various parts of the world, the military could 
provide at least theoretical responses.  
PINCHER recognized that, if faced with a confrontation with the whole of the Soviet 
military, aid to the Spanish military may arrive too late and that the immediate construction of 
bases may not be necessary. Spain, though strategically valuable in the eyes of the JWPC, 
maintained an ambiguous role in the event of a Soviet-American war in 1947-1948. The primary 
objective, the eradication of the “Soviet will to resist” could only be brought about swiftly by the 
“collapse of her totalitarian government; destruction of her industry or the complete disruption of 
her communication system (LOC lines of communication).”60 With the implications of a 
strategic air campaign against Soviet communications and transportation systems, air bases 
would be desirable. In the likely event that the Soviets overran the Rhine along with American 
bases in Western Germany, Iberian bases seemed attractive, but potentially unnecessary. 
PINCHER also admitted that, if the Soviets invaded by 1949, they would overrun each Western 
European nation in a matter of weeks, “The Red Army should have little difficulty in completely 
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overrunning Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Austria, and France.”61 In a matter of two 
months, the Soviet military could penetrate all the way to the Iberian Peninsula. 
 
 Photostat Annex, Geographical Section, General Staff in Joint War Plans Committee, 
423/3 “PINCHER”, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 27 April, 1946 RJCS Part II: The Soviet Union.  
 
In this case, Spain could serve a vital role with the Pyrenees as a natural barrier, but not 
as much else. The Iberian Peninsula could be a foothold on the Continent to which the armies of 
the Western Europe retreat if the Soviet armies overpowered them, “it is probable that any 
remaining allied forces might be withdrawn either to Italy, the Iberian Peninsula to protect the 
western entrance to the Mediterranean.”62 Since Spain’s thirty highly anti-Communist military 
divisions could be counted upon to resist a Soviet “occupation”, the air forces of United States 
and Great Britain would then disrupt exposed Soviet supply lines.63 With this in mind, the Joint 
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War Plans Committee predicted that the Soviets would attempt to stab directly toward the Iberian 
Peninsula. Yet this did not entail a commitment to defend Spain, since the planners felt confident 
that American and British air power could halt the Soviet advance on the doorstep of the 
Pyrenees. Some doubts lingered as to what political course of action the Caudillo would pursue, 
“In any event, Spanish assistance outside her borders cannot be counted upon to influence 
military action.”64 Nonetheless, PINCHER provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff a strategic 
understanding of a future war with the Soviet Union that did not entail any specific American 
commitments to Spain. 
Although the earlier reports of the planning staffs of the defense department examined 
Spanish potential through the one-dimensional prism of conventional military force, these studies 
enabled them to take into account domestic conditions in Spain. Admittedly, the earliest mention 
of Spain by the Joint Intelligence Staff simply examined the ability of Spain to militarily resist a 
Soviet invasion in their report titled “Invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by the USSR” of 
December 1946. Later known as the “’A’ Team Report”, it also examined the existing military 
bases of Spain, “Available facilities are sufficient for use of the present Spanish Air Force and 
will probably be ample to accommodate any Air Force expansion which might occur in the next 
three years.”65 As a conclusion to PINCHER, it determined no pressing need to make inroads to 
Spain. Even at this early juncture, the Defense planners realized that they could accomplish their 
wartime objectives of using Spain’s five hundred thousand man army, the fourth largest in 
Europe at the time, without so much as Franco’s assent. Though they were severely 
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underestimating the resolve of Franco, diplomatic concerns also began to appear from the 
perspective of the defense planners. 
Their following report “Soviet Logistic Capabilities for Support of Iberian Campaign and 
Air Assault on Great Britain”, likewise did not propose American involvement in Spain for more 
pessimistic reasons. Considering the implications for the “western end of the Mediterranean”, the 
JIS doubted that the United States and Allies stood a chance at stopping the Soviets in Spain, 
“The size of the forces required to assist the Spanish to defend Spain may be prohibitive in view 
of other demands upon our available forces.”66 The United States could simply not furnish the 
troops to make the defense of Spain feasible. Any aid—economic or military—would be wasted.  
The JWPC also revealed its ability to conduct an adequate and thorough economic, 
political, and military analysis of the Spanish question. In their subsequent report written in 
August 1947 titled “DRUMBEAT”, the Joint War Plans Committee marked a turning point in 
conceptions of Spain in the Defense community—they called for direct American economic 
assistance to the beleaguered Iberian nation. Despite their conclusion that the United States could 
afford to forgo an immediate resolution to the Spanish problem, the JWPC desired that resolution 
occur some time in the future. These military leaders never presumed to second-guess of the 
better judgment of their counterparts at the Department of State, and thus DRUMBEAT, “The 
Soviet Threat Against the Iberian Peninsula and the Means Required to Meet It” was consigned 
to the Defense Department’s growing shelf of future war scenarios. 
The Joint War Plans Committee extended the premises of PINCHER to anticipate a 
Soviet invasion of Western Europe first—thus eliminating the militaries of almost every 
American ally in a single fell swoop. The Soviet military would then harass American interests 
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in other areas around the world. The JWPC assumed that Spain would “actively resist a Soviet 
invasion of the Iberian Peninsula.”67 Should the Soviet military chose to overrun Spain and 
Portugal, the JWPC reasoned that they could do it with 50 divisions and 1,000 aircraft in about 
two months—or “D+60” after crossing the Pyrenees.68  
Aside from the military recommendations their plan put forward, the JWPC also 
recognized the political intricacies of the Spanish problem. They understood, that barring the 
unlikely event of another civil war in Spain or international pressure to remove Franco from 
power, he would most likely remain the Caudillo: 
 “The Franco government has been supported by powerful groups—the Army, the Church, the 
large landholders and the conservative business and financial classes…Against these forces and 
particularly the Army and police, masses of the Spanish people, hating Falange rule but dreading 
another civil war, have had no weapons to enforce their will. A myriad of clandestine political 
and labor groups are active but unable to achieve cooperation among themselves or gain the 
essential support of the Army for political change.”69 
 
This was quite a detailed report for those who the State Department considered to be inept at 
understanding the political. The Monarchists and petty bourgeoisie remained divided—with the 
majority falling into Franco’s orbit. If Don Juan, the Bourbon regent in exile, returned to Spain, a 
Conservative constitutional monarchy could potentially supplant Franco’s regime, “If Don Juan 
were to return, the government would still be anti-Communist and political activity would be 
permitted [to] other groups.70 The Joint Chiefs did not discount the return of a Socialist Spanish 
government—for it would not be pliable to Soviet political pressure. The chances of the latter 
case were slim since the Army and the Falange retained a monopoly on political power, and 
would most likely resist political change through force of arms. The Anarcho-Communist 
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elements of the former trade unions would surely side with the Soviet bloc if another 
confrontation similar to the Spanish Civil War were to again occur. 
Despite the current problems in Spain, the Joint War Plans Committee desired further 
action in Spain, in order to avoid direct American involvement—hence embracing a dictator. 
Rather, the JWPC through their political estimate of DRUMBEAT, sought to enable the 
Spaniards to defend themselves with minimal American involvement. Since Franco would be in 
Spain to stay, barring foreign interference in Spain’s internal affairs, the JWPC then considered 
what could best promote the Western defense, “Although very unlikely the next three years, 
continued poor living standards might in time result in a change to a government more 
sympathetic to the U.S.S.R.”71 An improved standard of living could improve not only the 
military situation in Spain, but the political one as well, “Communist infiltration is facilitated by 
poor economic conditions and conversely is inhibited by a good standard of living. Economic 
assistance might prevent significant pro-Communist sentiment in Spain and thus should 
strengthen the anti-Communist position.”72 The JWPC understood that other, perhaps more 
important political considerations were at stake in Spain and addressed them. Yet their choice 
was clear. Since political considerations at their extreme were not so different than political ones, 
the United States should resume economic relations with Spain, “The question of economic aid 
to Spain during peace is subject to many considerations; however, from the military point of 
view, improvement of Spain’s economic status is very desirable since it might remove the threat 
of a Soviet invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and thus safeguard the Straits of Gibraltar.”73 As 
Soviet influence grew, national security could rightly be called a political motivtion. The first 
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course of action DRUMBEAT advocated called for the United States to “furnish economic aid to 
Spain as soon as possible.”74 
It was at this point that the divide between military and political objectives seemed to 
dissolve. If the United States deferred its decision-making regarding Spain for fear of Soviet and 
Western European political repercussions, Stalin could continue to exploit the apparent discord 
among the Western Allies. Political opposition in Spain did exist; Franco permitted it to speak, 
but not act. One of the first American accounts of post-World War Spain put it succinctly, 
“Franco allows opposition mice to scurry until the squeaks become too loud. Then out flicks a 
paw and—silence.”75 Publishing anti-regime literature could still land one in prison. Yet, the 
opposition settled for this status quo if only to avoid repeating the Spanish Civil War. What 
opposition did exist in exile in France and the United Kingdom—the Monarchist and Socialist 
factions—remained divided over the issues of a monarchical restoration.76 The nominal Soviet 
patronage of the Socialists in exile also prevented an opposition alliance from forming, although 
this patronage had no “appreciable influence on its policies”.77 The only real purpose of this 
limited Soviet support, in the estimation of the JWPC, was to divide Franco’s foreign opposition, 
“Presumably this support is continued in part for propaganda purposes and in part in the hope of 
preventing a rapprochement of exiled republican and leftist groups with the monarchists.”78 The 
JWPC also analyzed Soviet intentions for not taking a more aggressive stance against Spain:  
“Although the Soviet government has urged that drastic measures be taken by the United Nations 
to oust Franco and has been loud in its support for the return of the republic, it is not believed that 
the Soviets are too dissatisfied with the present situation. Not only is Franco a convenient target 
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for their propaganda, but a peaceful change to a constitutional monarch, the only likely alternative 
to dictatorship, offers them little advantage.”79 
 
In their estimation, the JWPC recognized that the Spanish question could serve as a wedge issue 
among the nascent North Atlantic Treaty nations. The original purpose of the Tripartite 
Declaration was to bring about political improvements in Spain, among others, a “peaceful 
withdrawal of Franco, the abolition of the Falange, and the establishment of a caretaker 
government […], political amnesty, the return of exiled Spaniards, freedom of assembly and 
political association, and provision for free public elections”.80 Over the course of the previous 
year and a half, the civil authorities of the Tripartite Powers had not made any headway with 
their task. Perhaps economic incentives could lead to political improvements in Spain. Although 
no desirable course of action presented itself, at least economic aid could lead to the “only likely 
alternative to dictatorship.” 
The estimates of the JWPC were hardly shortsighted. As military recommendations first, 
DRUMBEAT identified the strategic importance of Spanish inclusion from the outset. At a 
certain point, these recommendations held great political importance. Yet it was possible, from 
the perspective of the Joint Chiefs, that economic coincide with political improvement. They did 
not forsake the lot of those that dissented from Franco’s Nationalists; they were not imperceptive 
of the important political questions of the day. Yet from a balanced political and military 
perspective, no viable alterative to Franco presented itself. 
Yet DRUMBEAT was a scenario that hinged upon a direct Soviet invasion of Spain—a 
proposition that the Joint Chiefs listed as unlikely. In the worst-case scenario, the Spaniards 
could hold out until “D+150”—or roughly five months after the Soviets began the invasion.81 
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This would provide the United States and its allies enough time to mount a relief or retreat effort. 
With a 1-to-1 ratio of Spanish defenders to potential Soviet adversaries, the Spaniards stood a 
chance of holding the Soviet advance to the Pyrenees. The British and American Air Forces 
could then halt the Soviet advance by delivering crippling blows to its resupply network 
extending across France and West Germany. 
 
Photostat Annex, JWPC 432/7. “DRUMBEAT”. August 4, 1947. RJCS: The Soviet Union: part II. 
 
DRUMBEAT was notable for several reasons. The JWPC put forward an accurate 
assessment of Spanish economic, political, and military considerations. It also displayed a keen 
perception of items not usually factored into political estimates such as topography, geology, 
hydrology, the state of public health, and agriculture. They mapped out every possible avenue of 
a potential Soviet invasion along with its different phases and analyzed what resources those 
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Soviet invaders would require while in Spain. The result was a sophisticated understanding of 
the Iberian Peninsula and its politics. The thoughtfulness and thoroughness of the war planners 
surpassed that of their counterparts at the Department of State. 
“BROILER”, a subsequent report by the Joint War Plans Group, the successor 
organization of the JWPC, with the aid of the Joint Intelligence Committee revealed that the 
Soviet Union could not penetrate as far as the Iberian Peninsula on account of logistical 
problems, thus ruling out the need for Spanish cooperation in advance. The report forwarded two 
opposing views, View A, which ruled out a Soviet invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, and View 
B, which anticipated one. Unless the Soviet military somehow managed to quickly eviscerate 
Iberian resistance, the supply problems detailed in View A would hinder troop movements. On 
this basis, the JIC recommended that military aid be designated to Spain in the event of war, but 
not before, since it would take the Soviets “D+90” to reach the foot of the Pyrenees in Southern 
France.82 This automatically precluded providing long-term military assistance to Spain. 
Specifically, it was the Soviet Union’s lack of aviation gasoline, access to European railroads 
that the allies would have demolished by this time, and experienced aircrews of a “Long Range 
Air Force” that would do as much damage to the Soviet advance as Allied bombs.  
The JIC determined in BROILER that Spain’s usefulness in the event of war was 
confined to its strategic location—not its military capabilities. For this, the JIC predicted that 
Franco would welcome Western militaries as to not fall beneath the Soviet axe himself. Again, it 
was preferable, but not necessary, that Spain’s military be reequipped so they could contribute to 
the defense of the Pyrenees. The Soviet military would most likely neutralize the nations of 
Western Europe, “It is concluded […]  that against probable opposing forces the Soviets have the 
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combat power to overrun key areas in Europe and Asia.”83 Yet the twenty-two military divisions 
of Spain comprising 521,000 soldiers would keep the Soviets occupied at the Pyrenees.84 This 
also amounted to one of the largest armies of Europe at the time. The Joint Chiefs understood the 
limitations of the Spaniards, “The Spanish Air Force could not make any substantial contribution 
to Western air effort […] The Spanish Navy reflects the economic and political conditions 
existing. It is hampered by lack of material and lags behind in technical improvements.”85 The 
Joint Chiefs concluded, “Spain’s contribution would be limited to providing bases for foreign 
strategic air units.”86 Although they did mention pursuing bases as a Spanish “contribution to the 
Western defense, there was not much mention of how or when the United States should pursue 
them.  
The final report involving an invasion of Western Europe and the potential role of Spain 
concluded that there was no immediate need for the United States to embrace Spain 
economically or militarily. As the Cold War heated up in early 1948, the Joint Strategic Plans 
Group sought to consolidate the Western European war plan in their March 1948 scenario 
“Bushwacker”. This report largely repeated what the earlier reports put forward with the notable 
exception that, by 1952, the Soviet Union would have acquired nuclear weapons of some sort 
and would be at war with the United States, “The U.S.S.R. will not have atomic bombs but will 
probably have other atomic munitions in limited quantity.”87 For Spain, the JSPG assumed that it 
would pursue neutrality in the event of war unless the Soviets attacked it. Like the previous 
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reports, a Soviet invasion of the Iberian Peninsula would allow for an Anglo-American 
counterattack. 
 Over the course of the war scenarios, the JWPC and the other Defense policy planners 
analyzed all aspects of the Spanish question—from the purely military to the purely political. 
They ultimately concluded that no immediate action in respect to Spain was necessary after 
considering other theoretical possibilities. They expected that, in the long-term, Spanish-
American rapprochement might occur and that the United States would furnish Spain with 
economic aid. This would have potentially obviated the need for an outright political alliance 
between the two countries, while enabling Spain to better defend its north frontier in the event of 
a Soviet attack. Considering the political implications involved in terms of Soviet propaganda, an 
indirect relationship with Franco was the most desirable option yet. Although some in the State 
Department likewise examined the Spanish question from a similar perspective, early opinion on 
Spanish exclusion remained largely unchanged. 
Spanish Exclusion from a State Perspective 
 
As the Defense Planners weighed different options in addressing the Spanish question, 
there existed few such preoccupations at the State Department—to whom the Defense 
committees deferred at nearly every early juncture. After the Second World War, resuming 
military or political relations with Spain at any level was out of the question—and for good 
reason. But in the following years, the White House and to the State Department leadership 
exhibited intransigence at pursuing other policy alternatives short of complete Spanish isolation. 
As the political needs of the United States changed, the foreign-policy leadership did not. 
In months immediately following the Second World War, the foreign policy 
establishment held to the line of Spanish exclusion from the community of nations. On the 
  Mendoza 37
grounds that Spain was not a “peace-loving state” as stipulated or membership into the United 
Nations by its Charter, other national delegations also agreed.88 At the Potsdam Conference in 
July 1945, acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew notified Secretary of State Byrnes that he 
intended to make public a letter critical of Franco from the recently deceased President Roosevelt 
without receiving previous instructions from Byrne to do so.89 Grew intended to flaunt 
America’s tough stance on Spain for the purposes of the Conference. These justifications also 
kept Spain from joining the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the predecessor 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.90 Following these early shows 
of American distaste of the Caudillo, the Tripartite Agreement of March 1946 between France, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States further reflected these sentiments. From the 
American perspective, the basis for early Spanish exclusion rested upon Grew’s conviction in the 
moment. 
Spanish non-recognition remained the status quo policy for several years and the State 
Department regarded any changes to it as somehow contrary to political considerations—
however narrowly the leadership defined them. Although it may be easy to dismiss criticism of 
the State Department position on Spain as simply cloaking the political in ideology, documentary 
evidence has not yet produced an alternative interpretation. Rather, it has reinforced the criticism 
that ideology bound the opinions of policy-makers. Instead of an economic basis or one that 
asserted an American understanding of its role within the Mediterranean region, these political 
considerations were purely ideological. This attitude persisted until early 1949 until 
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Congressional pressure forced the President’s hand. By October 1948, In a report titled “Spain 
and a Third World War” sent to the President Truman, Secretary of State, and Secretary of 
Defense, Jaume Miravitlles made the case against Spain via the State Department’s Directorate 
of Spanish Information. The report also served as a counterargument to several recent articles 
commenting on the senselessness of ignoring the military presence of Spain as a buffer to the 
Western European defense. Miravittles in “Spain and a Third World War” denounced the 
strategic and military importance of Spain based upon a deep resentment against Franco. As his 
experience during the Spanish Civil War rather justified, Franco, the Falange, and the 
Nationalists were odious to American notions of democracy. Yet strategic considerations 
remained, and Miravittles accordingly sought to discount these claims.  
Even as Miravittles examined such factors as geography to undermine the strategic 
importance of Spain, he frequently reverted to ideological language—betraying his premises for 
writing the report. In the exigency of a Soviet invasion, Miravittles had to first address the notion 
of the Pyrenees as a last line of European defense, “Spain has been one of the most oft-invaded 
countries in history. The mountainous nature of the Spanish terrain does indeed constitute a 
difficulty from the opposite, that is, from the defensive point of view, as will be indicated below 
(there is no room for large air-bases etc.).”91 From the times of the Celts and the Visigoths, 
military forces had been able to penetrate the Pyrenees, which rendered it an untenable position 
in the estimation of Miravittles.  
Not far behind geographical factors were the ideological ones that overruled the other 
aspects of political considerations. In the report, Miravittles attacked the integrity of the Spanish 
military. In his opinion, Spain’s 24 military divisions including the Spanish Foreign Legion were 
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comprised of undesirables, “it is important to note that the latter includes some 12,000 to 14,000 
German Nazis, Italian Fascists, Rumanians that fought with the Axis, Vichy French, etc.”92 
These estimates leaned on the side of speculation. As the former American Ambassador to Spain 
Carlton Hayes noted, Franco’s Spain also allowed for the repatriation of 1,200 Americans and a 
number he estimated at 30,000 “free” forces—soldiers of Nazi-conquered states such as France 
and Poland— all of whom passed through Spain.93 In full disclosure, Hayes also erred on the 
side of speculation—albeit on the other side. Spanish inclusion did not seem like a likely 
proposition with the sort of ideological baggage Miravittles described. 
Beyond criticizing the Spanish government under the Caudillo, the Office of Spanish 
Information insisted that the United States adopt a passive approach in removing Franco from 
power. He first made the case for the continued exclusion of Spain from the global economy, 
“Franco hopes that if there is a change of administration after the elections in the United States, 
the American attitude toward his regime will soften. With this hope, he holds out despite the 
desperate economic situation of the country.”94 Furthermore, they believed a diplomatic waiting 
game with Spain could unsettle its leadership, “Franco has made it plain that while he remains in 
power, no evolution toward democracy can take place.”95 Indirect and indeterminate, this plan 
maintained few actual benchmarks of amelioration. Miravittles made his case clear, “Franco 
must go.”96 By 1948, the current policy planning communities elected “not to scuttle the political 
considerations involved” in respect to its Spanish policy—as Miravittles defined them.97 
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At this point of diplomatic relations with Spain in late 1948, the policy planners at the 
Department of State saw the situation in Spain as beyond repair, but did not advocate a proactive 
solution in its stead. In their estimation, further economic isolation—and its attendant problems 
of social unrest caused by famine—could ultimately topple Franco's regime sometime in the 
future. Of course, this posed a moral dilemma since removing a dictator could entail the planned 
starvation of a people. By 1949, this became a possibility as a rainfall forty percent below the 
annual average of an already arid climate destroyed the domestic food supply.98 Without the 
importation of food and the credit to obtain it, Spain faced a humanitarian crisis. With a firm 
hold on the military, the possibility of galvanizing Spanish popular sentiment against foreign 
subversion bent on subjugating Nationalist Spain, and with no internal opposition willing to 
oppose him, Franco held onto power in Spain indefinitely. Little international help was 
forthcoming and the cost of Spanish isolation fell squarely on the Spanish people. Hopes for the 
contrary amounted to wishful thinking as the Spanish people were slowly starved. This 
consequence ran counter to the political objectives of the Western Allies as they stated in the 
Tripartite Declaration. Humanitarian, economic, or social aspects did not fit into the purview of 
these political considerations. By January 1949, the human cost of the current policy proved 
great.  
Political Errors and the Consolidation of the Fiefdoms 
 
The appearance of multiple policies in the eyes of foreign governments could generate 
severe repercussions on American foreign policy—and thus the Defense planners sought to 
preserve the initiative of the civil authority in respect to Spain. To some extent, the apprehension 
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of the diplomatic community in respect to the Spanish question was justified. During the 
escalation of the Cold War in 1948 and 1949, the battle for the hearts and minds began at the 
United Nations where the representatives of young nations gathered to ascertain what deals—if 
any—they could elicit from the superpowers. The perceived association of either the Soviet 
Union or the United States with fascism could be especially detrimental. When the Polish 
delegate to the United Nations, Katz-Suchy stated that a secret military agreement existed 
between Spain and the United States on May 6, 1949, the Department of Defense swiftly 
clarified its intentions, “Because of the political situation, no firm steps have been taken or are 
contemplated by the State Department in the near future in the direction of U.S. military 
cooperation with Spain. The existence of any such agreement as that alleged by the Polish 
delegate may be flatly denied.”99 This memorandum of clarification circulated to all of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff of the National Military Establishment and to their respective planning staffs. 
Promoting discord over the Spanish Question made it in the interest of the Soviet bloc not to 
resolve the issue too quickly. As long as the Western allies remained divided over strategic, 
political, and ideological concerns, Soviet delegates and allies could easy exploit their internal 
divisions at the United Nations. 
The notion of placing American military bases on Spanish soil gained some traction in 
the Navy towards the end of 1948, yet it also exposed the lack of unity among the various 
branches of the military. After Louis Johnson assumed the post of Secretary of Defense in March 
1949, he immediately set about proving himself by first reducing defense expenditures. 
Rumblings around Washington surfaced as to the future role of the Navy and the Marine 
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Corps.100 Secretary Johnson’s proposition of “Unified Command”—of separating military forces 
across the globe into separate operational zones accountable to a military leader regardless of 
service branch—divided the armed forces. He seemed to confirm the Navy’s suspicions when he 
cancelled the construction of what was to be America’s first super-carrier, the USS United States, 
on April 23—merely a month after assuming his new post—prompting the resignation of 
Secretary Sullivan of the Navy.101 Secretary Sullivan let his grievances be known, “The 
conviction that this result will result in a renewed effort to abolish the Marine Corps and to 
transfer all naval and marine aviation elsewhere adds to my anxiety.”102 
The Chief of Naval Operations Louis Denfield then reasserted the role of the Navy in the 
Mediterranean, especially along the extensive Spanish coastline. There was no denying the 
importance of the Air Force, which could deliver nuclear weapons to any target in the world in a 
matter of days. The Navy could not match this potential. As the British seemed increasingly 
incapable of managing the Mediterranean basin, the Navy brass hoped to base Admiral 
Sherman’s Mediterranean Fleet—later to become the U.S. Navy 6th Fleet—at the Seas’ most 
strategic points.103 In September 1949, Admiral Conolly of the Mediterranean Fleet visited 
Generalissimo Franco at his hometown, the port of El Ferrol, Galicia, with four Navy admirals in 
tow.104 Yet this only occurred as a response to the waning importance of the Navy in the eyes of 
Secretary of Defense Johnson. The Admirals billed their visits to Spain as “courtesy calls” to the 
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State Department and President Truman.105 This bid for attention did not constitute a serious plan 
on the part of the Navy for a long-term strategic commitment to the Iberian Peninsula. 
Before the Korean War, ambivalence towards the official American line towards Spain 
was growing apparent—especially among the members of the State Department who dealt most 
closely with Spain. Paul Culbertson, the State Department chargé d’affaires in Madrid, warned of 
the spillover effect that “political breakdown or disintegration” could have on American hopes 
for the “economic [and] political rehabilitation [of] Europe.”106 George Kennan and Under 
Secretary of State Robert Lovett, favored a more sensible approach. Lovett purportedly urged the 
National Security Council to “quit kidding ourselves” and adopt a reasonable Spanish policy 
which the Director of Western European Affairs, Theodore Achilles, mentioned to Culbertson; 
the “Kick-Franco-out-now” mentality of the State Department had to end.107 Kennan, author of 
the Long Telegram and founder of State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, called for at least 
diplomatic recognition of Spain since the Caudillo was entrenched in Spain to stay. In a letter to 
Lovett, Kennan expressed his “serious doubts” of the official line of the State Department, which 
in his opinion, was based upon “ideological grounds”.  Officially, these doubts comprised the 
substance of PPS/12: 
“The Policy Planning Staff has studied the question of our relations with Spain, which are 
unsatisfactory not only from the political point of view but from the viewpoint of our military 
planners. On the one hand, we have hoped to bring about the replacement of the totalitarian 
regime of General Franco by withholding from his government the benefits of international and 
political relationships. On the other, we are confronted with the fact that General Franco remains 
firmly in power and that his regime has actually been strengthened by demonstrations of 
international hostility.”108 
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Rather than embracing Franco’s regime, Kennan desired that neutral relations exist between the 
two nations, “the time has come for a modification of our policy toward Spain with a view to 
early normalization of U.S. Spanish relations, both political and economic.”109 The grievances of 
PPS/12 found their way into NSC 3, written in December 1947. The course of affairs in Spain 
could not be left to chance or inaction. Recent votes in the United Nations on Spanish 
membership also suggested that the international community was gradually preparing to include 
Spain, as the Brazilian delegation introduced a vote to the floor that would bring Spain back 
from diplomatic limbo.110 Yet resistance from the highest levels of the American government—
reaching to Secretary of State Acheson and President Truman—stalled solutions to the Spanish 
problem. 
With deferent military planners to a State Department unwilling to confront the political 
and economic realities of America’s new role in Europe, a sustained period of inaction persisted 
into the next decade. The military planning staffs made it clear in their early discussions of Spain 
that they regarded it as a component of the Western defense. The variance of what each report 
required of Spain certainly indicated at least that much. During this process, the Defense 
planners gained a valuable working knowledge of political concerns. Also during the course of 
their investigation, they recognized the urgency in securing the defense of Western Europe. Even 
then, they crafted circumspect war scenarios and left their plans to the prerogative of their peer 
institutions. In large part, the Miravittles estimation characterized sentiments of Spain in the 
foreign-policy establishment of the United States. Yet, by 1949, other nations had acted in their 
own self-interest by resuming unofficial trade with Spain. The United Kingdom bought Spanish 
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fertilizers and the French sold aircraft engines to Spain.111 Franco acquired the means to “hold-
out” despite the opinion of the Americans. If long-term economic and political considerations did 
not prevail, it was not for a lack of examination on the part of the Defense planners. At this point, 
ill-hatched political goals and their underlying ideological premises won out.  
 
 
Section III: The “Junketeers” on the Hill 
 
 
By early 1949, the Defense community received support through an unlikely conduit—a 
group known in Washington as “The Spanish Lobby”. Counting Senators, businessmen, and 
other civil servants among its number, the Spanish Lobby made significant inroads in the 
Beltway. 112 Congressmen from different parties and regions took up the cause of Spain. From 
the esoteric former United States Ambassador to Spain, Carlton Hayes, to the fervently anti-
Communist Senator, Patrick McCarran, the Spanish Lobby appropriated the language of defense 
to make the case for Spain. Though most had their own reelections in mind, these “Junketeers”, 
as Lowi described them, represented a wide variety of interests. Hayes formed the arguments for 
Spanish integration and McCarran crafted the legislation. These two figures served as the prime 
movers of the Spanish question. The political leaders of the Spanish Lobby tailored their 
approach towards Spanish inclusion based upon a variety of humanitarian, economic, and 
political considerations. After meeting resistance from President Truman, the Junketeers on the 
Hill portrayed the issue of Spanish inclusion by a politically sensitive aspect—that of strategic 
defense—and if the State Department could not provide it—they would look to the military men 
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of the Pentagon. After the President and some in Congress rejected political arguments for 
Spanish integration, strategic arguments became not only convenient, but also effective. 
In the summer of 1949, lawmakers in Congress realized that, despite the success of the 
European Recovery Program, American-aligned nations required more in the way of military aid 
to promote their internal stability. Addressing American national security interests in the way of 
economic stability were the Import-Export Bank, World Bank, and European Recovery Program. 
The Spanish Lobby wasted no time in attaching Spain to the security interests of the United 
States. Their interest in Spain emanated more from business interests and Catholic fealty than it 
did from a genuine interest in foreign affairs. Yet, as early as 1945, one of the most prominent 
academics of his generation was evaluating possible solutions to the Spanish question. 
The “Cloak and Gown”  
 
In the last months of his legation, Hayes appropriated the language of military and 
economic security as a part of American national policy to make the case for Spain, thereby 
providing the fundamental linkage between the defense of Spain and postwar American 
ambitions that other members of the Spanish Lobby eventually seized upon. Senator McCarran 
in particular saw these arguments as a way to address the policy vacuum with respect to Spain. 
They provided the basis for his tactics in Congress of combining political and military interests 
to further isolate his opponents, Secretary of State Acheson and President Truman. 
As a Catholic convert and established historian, Hayes seemed to delight in taking a 
revisionist path through his political and academic careers. From Hayes’ autobiography, he 
described his homecoming back to upstate New York, “As an old returning native, I find my 
position in the community somewhat anomalous. I am regarded as a bit ‘queer’, in part because 
of my occupation as historian is unique and generally incomprehensible, in part because I am a 
  Mendoza 47
Catholic and an enrolled Democrat.”113 From his choice to attend Columbia College instead of 
nearby Cornell to his early adherence to the historical method of his mentor, Charles Beard, 
Hayes defined himself against what he perceived to be common. His interest in Spanish history 
proved no different. In May, 1942, when President Roosevelt required a political outsider to 
quickly earn the ear of Franco to keep him from joining the Axis during Operation Torch in 
North Africa, he turned to Hayes.  
The very nature of Hayes’ mission to Spain underscored his early cognizance of the 
strategic issues behind the Spanish question. As even President Roosevelt prepared for Spain to 
align with the Axis after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, he nonetheless attached great 
importance in keeping neutral the nation that straddled the Straights of Gibraltar.114 As Franco 
attempted to exploit after the war, Spain remained non-belligerent and neutral during the 
Operation Torch of November, 1942. Hayes published his wartime reminiscences from his post 
as United States Ambassador to Spain in 1945. Toward the end of his recollections, Hayes 
launched into the case for Spain in his chapters titled “Spain’s Benevolent Neutrality” and “How 
I left Spain”. In a final meeting with the Foreign Minister, Jose Lequerica, Hayes remembered 
the Spaniard’s emphasis on strong Spanish-American relations, “On the other hand, he felt that if 
the United States…was to play its proper role in the postwar period, it should realistically utilize 
Spain as a special bulwark in Europe. He even hoped there might be special understandings 
between the United States and Spain—economic, political, and military.”115 More specifically, 
the United States ought to maintain a “good neighbor” policy with Spain, keeping open a 
“convenient European bridgehead for our armed forces” for future use “in case of emergency”, 
                                                        
113 Carlton Hayes, Unpublished Autobiography, Chapter 1, pp. 35. Box 8. Carlton J.H. Hayes Papers. 
114 Carlton J.H. Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain: 1942-1945. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 
1945), pp. 7. 
115 Ibid, pp. 287. 
  Mendoza 48
“Spain is just such a nation; and especially friendly future relations with her should not 
undermine, but rather buttress, any policy or program of collective world security.”116 Already 
on his trip back from Spain, Hayes considered how he could convince others of Spain’s 
economic, political, and strategic importance. 
It is important not to dismiss Hayes’ position on Spain as simply pro-Catholic since 
virtually alone in his support of Spain, receiving much criticism as a fallen liberal. Though his 
faith undoubtedly added to his fervor for his new cause, Hayes weighed political and strategic 
issues foremost. Throughout his ambassadorship, Hayes even received letters from family 
friends and acquaintances urging him to actively condemn Spain, “I urge you to stop apologizing 
for the fascist Franco regime. To repudiate it instead.”117 Hayes also kept watch on the Office of 
Strategic Services to ensure it would not actively seek the ouster of the Spanish Caudillo as one 
of his former history students, Donald Downes, conducted covert operations in Spain beginning 
in 1943.118 
 Before Hayes left Madrid, he also took an active role in acquainting students, academics, 
and politicians with the importance of Spain beyond its strategic importance. Upon learning of 
the arrival of a young Spanish professor of legal theory, Ignacio de Lojendio, to the United States 
on a speaking tour endowed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Hayes 
promoted it to his academic colleagues as well as his friends in Washington to foster “mutual 
understanding between the United States and Spain.”119 For his part, de Lojendio conducted over 
forty lectures and was well-regarded. Before he returned to Spain, he likewise called for 
sensibility on the Spanish question,  
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“I tell you most sincerely that the better I get acquainted with the fantastic tide of literature on 
post-war planning, the more I feel alarmed at the shortsightedness of so many people who waste 
time either in rabid manifestations of revenge and hatred, or in a no less sterile display of pious 
phases which get nowhere.”120 
 
Since Hayes published his diaries in the same year he returned from overseas service and 
considering the extent of his pro-Spanish activities that far exceeded his role as Ambassador, it is 
clear that Hayes was apprehensive about Spain’s postwar prospects. He often turned Franco’s 
response to his global political predicament into a virtue—attempting to reconcile the 
participation of the German Condor legion in the Spanish Civil War with the withdrawal of the 
Spanish Blue Division from the Eastern Front in the Second World War—straining logic at best. 
While Franco never hindered the Allies, he certainly never helped them. Yet some of these 
arguments held their sway. As a nation that by 1949 had not yet embarked down the road to 
recovery, Spain was ripe for foreign investment if inducements for international trade could 
remove the restrictive trade barriers that Spain maintained as an autarkic nation. Now that Hayes 
had provided the basis, it was up to others to argue for Spanish integration in the halls of power. 
Containment, the Anti-Communists, and Congress 
 
There was probably no more influential figure in recombining military and political 
interests than Senator Patrick McCarran, the Nevada Democrat. It was Senator McCarran who 
originally argued Ambassador Hayes’ points on the floor of the Senate, not only inserting Hayes 
articles into the Congressional Record, but in some cases having them read aloud. 121 Hayes’ 
Wartime Mission to Spain carried considerable weight since it offered a firsthand perspective of 
the situation in Spain from the top American diplomat in the country. Yet Senate opposition 
prevented Spain from receiving European Recovery Program funds in 1948. Led by “Big” Tom 
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Connolly of Texas, the Senate voted to exclude Spain from receiving Marshall Plan aid after the 
House of Representatives voted to include Spain on the landmark legislation.122 Attempting to 
secure funds for Spain through the other methods—namely the Mutual Defense Assistance Act 
and later the Economic Cooperation Act. McCarran exhibited an unusual amount of political 
organization toward the Spanish Question and it is doubtful that without his constant pressure on 
the Truman administration, the base agreements could have occurred. After another failed 
attempt in Congress in 1949, he even flew to Madrid to discuss potential integration issues with 
Franco, inciting a rebuke from the President, Secretary Acheson, and Congressional 
opponents.123  Franco was one of McCarran’s “favorite foreign leaders.”124 
 
Nevada Historical Society, Reno as it appears in Pat McCarran: Political Boss of Nevada 
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Behind the polemics and invectives, McCarran raised the important issue of economic 
integration. If the European Recovery Program was designed to create a community of interests 
in Europe that a future way be avoided, why should Spain be excluded? 
Since the conclusion of the Second World War, Senator McCarran channeled his 
populism from before the war and his patriotism during the war to unabashed anti-Communism 
after the war. Moreover, the sight of a Catholic Spain starving from years of economic autarky 
left McCarran eager to improve the lot of Catholic Spain. An early opportunity presented itself in 
the form of Spanish membership into the North Atlantic Treaty. McCarran still possessed the 
fiery rhetoric that had originally propelled him into politics: 
“I need go no further than to quote the Secretary of State [Acheson] before the Appropriations 
Committee—‘Spain would be a most essential element in the North Atlantic Treaty’—essential 
from a military standpoint, essential from an economic standpoint, essential from a diplomatic 
standpoint, indeed, essential from every standpoint to the welfare and successful operation of the 
treaty, and, indeed to the welfare of the democratic, liberty-loving, God-fearing peoples of the 
world.”125 
 
It was McCarran’s intention that the United States Ambassador to the United Nations vote 
favorably to ending the ban on diplomatic relations with Spain as originally put forward in the 
United Nations Charter. The implications of McCarran’s invective resounded across the 
Senate—opposition to the inclusion of a Christian nation seeking America’s protective embrace 
amounted to subversion of American national interests. A year after McCarran delivered the 
previous statement he crafted the “Internal Security Act”. This Act of Congress proscribed from 
defense-industry jobs those who maintained an affiliation with a group that the federal 
government defined as ‘Communist’. Alongside Senator McCarthy, McCarran distinguished 
himself as one of America’s greatest red-hunters of the Cold War. 
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Part of McCarran’s strategy was to discredit Secretary of State Acheson for his earlier 
intransigence on the Spanish Question. Despite his emotional and rhetorical appeals for Spanish 
inclusion into the defense network of the North Atlantic Treaty, McCarran also Senator 
McCarran continued his early invective into what eventually became a convenient target, “It has 
been extremely difficult for some of us to understand why that it was that our State Department 
seemed to be stymied in regard to diplomatic recognition of Spain…Mr. President, why is it that 
the State Department refuses to recognize Spain?”126 Senator McCarran dispensed with his 
appeals of pathos and instead made the case in the Senate on pragmatic grounds, “However, I 
believe that anyone who is a strategist will agree that there is nothing more essential to the 
military success of the North Atlantic Pact—if it means military success—than the Iberian 
Peninsula.”127 Much like the simple reduction the Defense planners, the most salient argument 
for Spanish integration revolved around the simple balance of conventional military forces 
between the Soviet bloc and the West.  
Over the course of first the NATO and the European Cooperation Act debates, McCarran 
and the Spanish Lobby extracted various components of the Spanish question on the floor of the 
Senate to display how the current approach was not meeting political concerns. McCarran won 
some unlikely allies during this display of senatorial showmanship. Senator Brewster, a 
Republican from Maine and a staunch anti-Communist, echoed McCarran’s sentiment against 
the State Department: 
“What of the operation of our Air Force? I wonder what the aviation directors of our 
military forces would say regarding this matter? I wonder if their voice has been heeded in 
connection with the attitude of the State Department upon this score—whether or not the 
Department has considered the significance of our attitude with respect to our future security in the 
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event of the development of the Moscow menace until it shall result actually in an attack and an 
aggression.”128  
 
Defense interests for Brewster amounted to American air power. Other followers joined 
McCarran and Brewster on Spain. Senator Wherry (R-NE) and Senator Eastland (D-MS) 
concerned themselves with opportunities for cotton exports to Spain. Senator Eastland exposed 
the raw economic opportunity that existed, “Spain ranks third today among the nations of Europe 
in potential textile production […] Yet the employees of Spanish textile mills are able to work 
only one and a half days a week because of the scarcity of cotton.”129 Senator Chavez (D-NM) 
brought to light the great human cost of Spanish exclusion during a time of drought, “Let us go a 
little further. Is our general policy and the policy of the Marshall plan to do good to the world, to 
feed hungry people? Is that philosophy and that noble purpose to be set aside and the hungry 
children of Spain be allowed to die simply because we do not like Mr. Franco?”130 Rhetoric 
aside, the members of the Spanish Lobby began to expose the policy failings of the Truman 
Administration in respect to Spain. To make matters worse, Truman offered no substantive 
rebuttals, cornering him further into his original ideological redoubt for Spanish exclusion. 
A year later in 1950, the Spanish Lobby attempted again to secure Spanish inclusion—
this time issue through the Economic Cooperation Act. Using the arguments Hayes first put 
forward, Western defense grew to be an issue of utmost importance. For the members of the 
Spanish Lobby, foreign policymakers—such as the State Department—ignored military interests 
when crafting political decisions. The result was a North Atlantic alliance more militarily 
vulnerable than it had been at the end of the Second World War. 
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McCarran’s approach was simple: arrange for a constant stream of military representative 
from the mid-echelons to repeat to members of Congress how important a component Spain was 
to the Western Defense. He wasn’t shy about his tactics. In an article he wrote for the Saturday 
Evening Post, McCarran outlined the basic problem with the Spanish question as it had played 
out, “They (shirt-sleeve boys of the Pentagon) saw that the Iberian peninsula had great value to 
the West if it comes to war. But the military does not make decisions if political questions 
intrude.”131 Unofficially, McCarran arranged for the “technical men”—the “lower echelon” 
planners to drift around Congress until, “Congress caught the cue.”132 
Another member of the Spanish Lobby, Representative Clement Zablocki attempted 
similar tactics in the House of Representatives. He brought the issue to the Chiefs of Staff of the 
Air Force, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, during the Mutual Defense Assistance Program 
hearings.  “In the case of Spain wanting to come under the military assistance program—first of 
all, I am going to ask you, General, if you would care to comment on the value of Spain in our 
defense plan.”133 Although Zablocki continued the line of questioning, and though General 
Vandenberg offered his comments on Spain off the record, Spanish integration now was an 
indirect or hypothetical factor, “In any case of emergency we would all be in it together and 
these people would contribute certain armed forces, bases and so forth…There are things that 
could be furnished in the way of bases and contributions of definite forces to the collective 
defense set-up.”134 McCarran’s early efforts required sustained effort, but he was determined to 
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restate the Spanish question as an urgent military and political matter that required Congressional 
action.  
Although a partisan member of the Spanish Lobby, McCarran was frustrated by the 
lapses he perceived of the Mutual Defense Act. As a measure to address the shortcomings of the 
European Recovery Program, opponents in the State Department neglected military measures on 
account of Spain’s fascist leanings—that is to say, political considerations. In the process, the 
greater need of American national security was not being satisfied. McCarran finally got his way 
through the Economic Cooperation Act on April 27, 1950—securing a 50 million dollar loan for 
Spain.135 Although this did not amount to a large sum, it demonstrated a change in sentiments 
toward Spain. By the time of the ECA vote in April 1950, McCarran was able to convince a third 
of the Senate that a new approach to the Spanish question was necessary. Within two months, the 
Korea War would convince another third and the Junketeers could pursue even more funding 
opportunities for Spain—in the amount of $62.5 million. Yet the ECA and other foreign aid 
organization answered in one form or another to the State Department. They still maintained 
initiative on the resolving the Spanish question. 
 
Section III: Making up for Lost Time 
 
 
The confrontation between Secretaries Acheson and Johnson marked a new period in the 
history of the Pact of Madrid, one in which the civil authority designated more policy-making 
prerogative to the planning staffs of the Defense Department. It also had an unintended 
consequence: the radicalization of the “Junketeers”. A number of other complications led to 
Johnson’s ouster, but a large share of the blame, perhaps most of it, resided with Secretary of 
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State Acheson. Although Acheson also came to accept the possibility of diplomatic relations 
with Spain in early 1950, their rivalry eventually revealed the ultimate source of Anti-Spanish 
sentiment; President Truman detested Franco’s regime. From a number of offhand remarks, it 
became clear that President Truman based his political assessments of Spain on a deep-seated 
distrust of Spanish backwardness. Once the circumstances of the Korean War overcame this 
obstacle, the continuation of the political considerations alongside military ones accelerated. Yet, 
it was precisely the inability of the State Department to heed its own advisers that exposed their 
subversion of the national political interest due to personal sentiments. This redirected the 
initiative on the Spanish question to an alternative avenue, that of military planning. Before it 
could get there, the Junketeers made one last push to consolidate their gains. 
A year later in 1950, the issue reemerged in the Senate as hearings for Economic 
Cooperation Act. Using the arguments Hayes first put forward, Western defense grew to be an 
issue of utmost importance. For the members of the Spanish Lobby, foreign policymakers—such 
as the State Department—ignored military interests when crafting political decisions. The result 




 By this time, Congressional leaders indicated the desirability of pursuing a better policy 
in respect to Spain—one that at least placed an Ambassador back in Spain. Johnson favored such 
an approach, but had earned himself the distrust of his admirals in the process. The resulting 
confrontation resulted in Truman sacking Johnson and Congress browbeating Acheson until he 
pursued a course in Spain more in line with American national interests. 
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After several contentious years on Capitol Hill, lawmakers finally placed a premium on 
shoring up the Western defensive network. Furthermore, certain members of Congress like 
Senator McCarran made the case that if the National Security bodies of the federal government 
did not function, the Defense Department should not be overlooked. In a memorandum to 
Secretary of State Acheson in April 1949, Secretary of Defense Johnson emphasized the need to 
at least give the military the option of military coordination with Spain should a national 
emergency develop, “One of the most important of these matters is the consummation of 
political relations and arrangements which will permit the United States military cooperation 
with that nation.”136  Johnson was not without a premise, for Kennan influenced NSC/3 to a large 
extent on account of his frustrations with the apparent inertia of the State Department at pursuing 
any sort of proactive policy regarding Spain. 
As far as tangible goals were concerned, then Secretary Johnson pushed for either 
bilateral relations between Spain and the United States or even full-acceptance into NATO. In a 
revision of his previous memorandum, Secretary Johnson through the Joint Plans Committee of 
the JCS added an additional clause on normalizing relations with Spain: “either bilaterally or 
acceptance of that nation as a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty or Western Union 
Treaty.”137 To be clear, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee as a matter of policy desired the 
full support of its most powerful Western allies, France and the United Kingdom, “the United 
States will ascertain the position of the British and French delegations with respect to Spain but 
also that it will press for the acceptance by the United Kingdom and France of the objectives of 
United States policy.”138 Bilateral military agreements of forces between the United States and 
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Spain required American allies to concede that the best guarantor against a Soviet invasion, the 
United States military, may retreat behind the Pyrenees in the event of war. This was an 
unacceptable proposition for NATO allies. From their perspective, they required military aid and 
any designated for elsewhere—much less Spain—would not go to reinforcing the front along the 
Iron Curtain that had recently descended across Europe. Politically speaking, this would produce 
a demoralizing effect in Western European capitals and could perhaps embolden Communist 
elements within those nations—which had been the intent of all the American foreign aid to 
avoid. These were the political considerations that required further articulation, which the State 
Department did not provide. 
 Just a month prior to the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, Secretary 
Johnson testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Senator Cain of Washington 
inquired as to Johnson’s views on Spain, “How serious is this Government in pursuit of the 
ambitions to protect the North Atlantic area?” The Secretary of Defense responded, “My job is to 
encourage these nations over there, help them all we can. So, I am trying to stay away from 
statements such as I might have to make that would cause trouble for some of our North Atlantic 
partners. It’s not just an American problem.”139 It was apparent that, until the end of his tenure as 
Secretary of Defense, Johnson favored Spanish inclusion.  
 
Acheson versus Johnson 
 
 Despite the earlier victory of Johnson in instituting efficiency in the Department of 
Defense, the lack of coordination of military and political policy outside of Europe reflected 
poorly upon him. Secretary Acheson and President Truman attached “little strategic value” to the 
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Korean Peninsula in early 1949.140 This prompted Johnson to specifically ignore drawing up a 
defensive plan of action in Korea.141 As the Korean Conflict increased in intensity, Johnson, 
President Truman’s ally in the reigning in of the Defense Department fiefdoms, called into 
question Acheson’s circumspection. That Communist forces secured victories in China and now 
threatened in Korea, undermining the whole notion of Containment. Meanwhile, the White Paper 
on China of Acheson was supposed to bring the deteriorating situation in the Far East to a 
stasis—an option that again appeared several years too late.142  
 Personalities also interfered with policy. Johnson and Acheson clashed over Spanish 
question—further prolonging the Spanish question. In the wake of the North Korean invasion of 
South Korean, Johnson sought to obtain military rights with nations that remained undecided in 
the case the Korean War broadened. Taking issue with Johnson’s intent to establish “military 
accessibility and military cooperation with Spain”, Secretary Acheson indicated he would 
tolerate nothing of the sort, “The Department is fully aware of the desirability of developing 
relations with Spain which will permit closer military cooperation. In the Department’s opinion, 
however, the political considerations outlined above make the program suggested by the [JCS] 
politically impracticable at this time.”143 Acheson, presumably with the favor with President 
Truman, effectively sealed off any more analysis of the Spanish question within the executive 
authority until the end of the year, when international circumstances again thrust the Spanish 
question into broad view. 
President Truman wanted to fire Johnson when the timing was right, but due to a lack of 
a private setting, Truman sat on the news for about a week until The Washington Times Herald 
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somehow received word of it on September 8, 1950.144 It was Monday, September 11 that 
Truman managed to lay the news on Johnson. The pugilist left Truman’s office “dejected’ and 
“beaten”.145 General George Marshall relieved Johnson as Secretary of Defense immediately 
afterward.146 Wary of the thankless job he was about to assume, Marshall stipulated to President 
Truman that we would stay on as Secretary of Defense for only a year having already designated 
his longtime subordinate, Robert Lovett, as his successor.147 As the course of the war improved, 
the highly esteemed Marshall was drawn into the conversation concerning General Douglas 
MacArthur’s insubordinate conduct in Korea. Although few would dare to levy much criticism at 
Marshall’s expense, Senator McCarthy dubbed the venerate general “a front man for 
traitors.”148As the former Secretary of State who created the scheme for European postwar 
recovery that bears his name, Marshall respected the civil-military divide—to the extent that he 
never voted in his life.149  
Like most things during his Presidency, the buck of the Spanish question stopped at 
Truman. Despite the high-level political maneuvering of all involved, the nature of Truman’s 
opposition rested in that he did not trust a country without full religious freedom. By this point, 
the stringently ideological component of Truman’s defense fell away as favored granting foreign 
aid to Tito’s Yugoslavia and, by August 4, 1950, to China.150 Before the newly appointed 
American Ambassador Stanton Griffis left for Madrid in February 1951, Truman mentioned to 
                                                        
144 McFarland, Johnson pp. 343. 
145 Ibid, pp. 343. 
146 Borklund, Men of the Pentagon. pp. 89. 
147 Ibid, pp. 89. 
148 Sherman Adams. “Ike’s Awkward Alliance with the Old Guard.” Time Magazine, May 19, 1961. pp. 
136. 
149 Borklund, Men of the Pentagon. pp, 112. 
150 John G. Norris. “Acheson-Johnson ‘Feud’ Discounted, Although They Often Disagree” Washington 
Post. September 18, 1949, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. (accessed 1/10/10), pp.1; Truman 
Decision of Aid to China Reverses Position. Atlanta Daily World. August 4, 1950 ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers. (accessed 1/10/10). 
  Mendoza 61
him, “I am a Baptist and I believe that in any country man should be permitted to worship his 
God in his own way. The situation in Spain is intolerable. Do you know that a Baptist who dies 
in Spain must even be buried in the middle of the night?”151 Truman was a Grand Mason, the 
highest order of freemason, and Spain’s anti-Masonic laws that often entailed death for offenders 
deeply troubled him to the core.152  Truman also dragged his feet when it came to allocating the 
$62.5 million dollars Congress had allowed the President to spend on Spanish loans.153 The State 
Department made the ECA allotment so difficult to use that it was not reallocated until 1952—to 
the military planners.154 Without the support of even Acheson, Truman distanced himself the 
Congressional action on Spain and mischaracterized the nature of his own role, “I don’t like 
Franco and I never will, but I won’t let me personal feelings override the convictions of our 
military men.”155 By mid 1951, more than just the military men were convinced, in fact, it was 
Congress that convinced the military men to assume a greater role in solving the Spanish 
question. 
The Radicalization of the Spanish Lobby 
 
The sudden outbreak of war in Korea presented an opportunity for pro-Spanish elements 
in Congress to finally achieve the prerogative of the Defense planners in establishing relations 
with Spain for the purpose of channeling American funds to Spain. Although most of the 
Congressmen and Senators involved pursued the general policy of economic liberalization and 
expansion of markets, their brief taste of political success prompted a radicalization of the 
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Spanish Lobby. They tacked hard to the right, making the political component more difficult to 
predict. In order to finally put forward a Spanish policy, the political price for compromise had 
increased.  
Upon his return to the academic community from his hiatus as Ambassador to Spain, 
Hayes adopted a stridently political line—determined to secure Spanish integration. Congress 
had already proscribed Spain from the European Recovery Program. American allies had not yet 
decided to include Spain in NATO. The only existing avenue from which Spain could procure 
foreign credits was through President Truman’s discretionary Mutual Defense budget. Spain did 
obtain some funds for an Import-Export bank fertilizer project, but this did not amount to 
much.156 Hayes desired a steady stream of American assistance to Spain. To obtain this, he again 
articulated the academic and political case for Spain in his 1951 work, The United States and 
Spain: an Interpretation. This amounted to an academic and historical account for the 
improvement of relations between Spain and the United States. 
Hayes expressed shared Spanish-American interests on a greater social level than just 
mutual security—he desired a greater community of shared political interests that extended 
across the Atlantic. In his justification of Spanish inclusion, Hayes saw Spain as integral member 
of what he termed “the whole Atlantic Community”—steeped in the values of Western 
Civilization.157 He favored a more pragmatic Spanish policy. Spain, to Hayes, was an essential 
component of the ‘Atlantic Community,’ “The freer it is, the more naturally does commercial 
intercourse draw together the whole Atlantic Community, and the more clearly does it indicate 
the interdependence of America and Europe.”158 The United States and Spain appeared as a 
general course of policy, combining the circumspection of a professional academic with the 
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ideological bent of a Presidential appointee. Hayes concluded the book with a prescription 
uncommon of academic literature: 
“What is desirable in relations between the United States and Spain should by now be 
clear. With Spain we should establish and maintain especially close and cordial relations. We 
should do so in our own interest, in that of the Atlantic Community, and in that of a decent, 
peaceable world order. And Spain, having like interests, can be counted upon to reciprocate.”159 
 
For Hayes, this could mark the beginning of a new world order buttressed by mutual 
understanding and cooperation between Spanish and English speaking peoples across the free 
world—if it could be called that. 
Skeptical about the motivations and academic references of the intellectual left, Hayes 
weighed in on what he perceived to be the intellectual susceptibility of American civil servants 
to subversive ideologies, “Moreover, the Spanish Republicans supplied plenty of propaganda 
calculated to appeal to ‘liberals’ and ‘progressives’ abroad and particularly marketable in the 
United States during the period of our ‘New Deal’”.160 Continuing on the topic of the Communist 
propaganda of the Spanish Republicans, Hayes mentioned, “And it must be recognized that a 
number of journalists on our more staid and conservative newspapers, and I fear, some officials 
of our State Department, have taken their cue about Spain from the Nation or PM.”161 These 
publications, in Hayes’ opinion, printed tainted articles after “fellow travelers” from Spain 
gained a following among the New York literati. He derided the relative inexperience of then 
future of Secretary of State when negotiations with Spain over the bases began, “There was also 
a new, non-career Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, who was a close personal friend 
of Alger Hiss and had the reputation at the time of being especially conciliatory toward Russia 
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and hostile to ‘Franco Spain’”162. Although Acheson had risen to become the full Secretary by 
then, Hayes still approached him with distrust. 
 After taking aim at those New Dealers left in high office that did not favor Spanish 
inclusion, Hayes discussed concrete steps the United States could take to consolidate Spain into 
the Western defense. Highly critical of the Senate’s exclusion of Spain from European Recovery 
Program funds after the House of Representatives Hayes reasoned that the United States had 
already aligned itself with Tito’s Yugoslavia, that nations like Iceland and Canada were included 
in NATO yet Spain could not even secure economic aid by 1949. He echoed his internationalist 
views in the name of Containment, “We should expand the North Atlantic Pact into a defensive 
alliance of the whole Atlantic Community including Spain and Latin America…What it [Spain] 
lacks is up-to-date military equipment, and a first counsel of wisdom would seem to be for us to 
help supply that lack. An investment by us in Spain would be surer to strengthen our defense 
than what we are contributing to certain other countries.”163  
Regardless of his political leanings, Hayes was influential in all the circles that 
mattered—diplomatic, academic, and retained some influence in the military as well. As a 
devoted member of the Spanish Lobby, it is apparent that many of the arguments that originated 
with Hayes appeared in Senator McCarran’s statements or anywhere else the Spanish Lobby 
found an audience. In this way, Hayes continued as their intellectual base through the negotiation 
of the base agreements. 
The Retractions Begin 
 
As the Spanish Lobby achieved a great score in respect to establishing some sort of 
greater relationship with Spain, they forced top lawmakers to withhold their opposition to the 
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nascent Spanish policy. One of the strongest Spanish opponents in the Senate, “Big” Tom 
Connolly publically retracted his previous view.164 Citing the impracticality of ignoring Spain 
and thus ignoring the political, a new approach was required, “It is now clear that this action [the 
1946 United Nations ban on Ambassadors] has not only failed in its intended purpose but has 
served to strengthen the position of the present regime.”165 Specifically, the negligence of the 
political was to blame, “In our view, the withdrawal of ambassadors from Spain as a means of 
political pressure was a mistaken departure from established principle.”166 This mistaken 
departure entailed a disregard for establishing diplomatic relations with Spain.  
The leaders of the American foreign policy establishment were now conceding that their 
former political objectives revolved too closely around ideological considerations. On July 20th, 
further down the National Mall, Secretary Acheson in the State Department conceded as much: 
 “first, there is no sign of an alternative…second, the internal position of the present regime is 
strong and enjoys the support of many who, although they might prefer another form of 
government or chief of state, fear that chaos and civil strife would follow a move to overthrow the 
government; third, Spain is a part of Western Europe which should not be permanently isolated 
from normal relations in that area.”167  
 
One of Acheson’s justifications for Spanish exclusion was the UN ban on ambassadors to Spain. 
On November 4, 1950, over two-thirds of the General Assembly approved the rescinding of the 
ban.168 Thus, it was time for the United States to name an ambassador. At this point, Washington 
had already conveyed its distaste for the Spanish Caudillo after five years of benign neglect. 
Negotiations with those who permitted the Spanish exclusion in the first place would be highly 
problematic and as the Secretary of State knew well, would most likely be met with suspicion. 
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 The military aspect constituted only part of an overall policy. Not much of one existed 
prior to 1951. Although American civil servants at the highest levels now readily conceded that 
the United States adopt a realistic policy in respect to Spain, the question now was which agency 
should begin the negotiating? The State Department still maintained the initiative to begin a 
policy, but had discredited themselves by ignoring the Spanish question. During the previous 
year, the State Department and the Defense Department revised each other’s versions of NSC 72 
ad nauseam. Beyond his initial dismissal of NSC 72, Secretary Acheson and President Truman 
stood alone against the political current until the United Nations removed its prohibition on 
placing ambassadors in Spain in November 1950. Not having a Spanish ambassador could lead 
to further political complications. Stanton Griffis, who had briefly served with the Office of 
Strategic Services in Spain during the Second World War, arrived in Madrid in February 1951 to 
assume his position as the United States Ambassador to Spain.  
 
 
Section IV: The Pact of Madrid 
  
 
In July 1951, Congress and the President had finally agreed over Spanish integration in 
NSC 72/6. The construction of bases, negotiated by the military planners of the Defense 
Department, solved both lingering problems. It would provide strategic security while not 
establishing a full political reconciliation with Franco’s Spain—thereby alienating America’s 
NATO allies. Yet friction persisted and had existed during the previous year. Although the 
President and the State Department no longer actively hindered the Spanish policy from going 
forward, they were only recently aroused from bureaucratic inertia, and thus desired more 
deliberation on the Spanish policy. By the time the Franco and Ambassador James Dunn signed 
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the Pact of Madrid in 1953, the United Nations had already signed an armistice ending the 
Korean War. On account of the inefficacy at the State Department and the need to maintain some 
political distance from Franco’s Spain, the National Security Council allowed the military 
planners to negotiate the better part of the Spanish-American agreements—particularly their 
economic aspect. It was at this point that the military planners undertook political aspects of the 
Spanish policy that the State Department, for various reasons, could not.  
NSC/72 
Although the military planners worked in concert with representatives from the State 
Department, years of slow-moving diplomacy exposed its organizational lapses. During the 
previous year, the State and Defense Departments addressed the Spanish question in NSC 72. As 
the Korean War raged in the summer of 1950 and McCarran’s amendment to the Omnibus 
Appropriation for 1951-1952 passed, Louis Johnson put forward NSC 72 for the purpose of 
entering into military alliance with Spain in June 1950. Secretary Acheson swiftly 
countermanded it in NSC 72/1. With an ambassador now headed for Spain, it was now 
impossible to delay the resolution of the Spanish question any further. Acheson indicated as 
much in NSC 72/2 of January 1951, “Thus, if we do not soon determine to exploit Spain’s 
strategic position and to develop its military potentialities, manpower, and resources, we may 
well lose the opportunity.”169 The foreign policy agencies—under the moderating influence of 
the National Security Council, which was designed in 1947 to coordinate American foreign 
policy—came together for another attempt at the Spanish question. 
Although the State Department began to address political and economic concerns with 
the Spanish policy, the military planners had come to expect a continuance of the State 
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Department ‘s rigidity. Until January 1951 they had good reason. In NSC 72/3 of late January, 
Secretary Marshall of the Defense Department proposed that the United States proceed with “a 
sense of urgency” to incorporate Spain.170 Ideally, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—
founded in 1949 to ensure greater military cohesion among North Atlantic nations—would 
accept Spain and that the United States could provide Spain with aid through the Mutual Defense 
and European Recovery Programs. Yet Marshall understood this outcome was not probable. 
Marshall concurred with Acheson’s earlier political estimate for American’s European allies. A 
valid political concern, establishing a line of retreat behind the Pyrenees and providing military 
aid to Spain perhaps at the expense of other allied nations could damage the prestige of 
American-aligned governments. NSC 72/3 sought to clarify the preeminence of NATO in 
American strategy, “NAT countries have priority for our aid and for material under the NAT, 
MDAP, and ERP.”171 After overcoming political restraints, NSC 72/3 established the priorities 
of the new Spanish policy—priorities that would be accomplished with the “close coordination 
between officials of the Department of State and Defense.”172  
Delineating the roles of the Departments in forming the new Spanish policy was a 
difficult task. In similar negotiations with other European recipients of American economic aid, 
it was the European Cooperation Agency with much oversight from the State Department that 
stipulated the conditions under which the United States would deliver aid. Yet the State 
Department would now contend with the opposition of American allies if the United States 
pursued any Spanish aid scheme. It could not maintain a very active role in the Spanish 
negotiations. NSC 72/3 suggested that the Defense Department, through its Civil Aeronautics 
Administration, to begin transferring “as much as possible of the air navigational aids and other 
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electronic equipment”.173 From civilian aid, the Defense Department would then offer 
“consultation and technical advice concerning the improvement of Spanish ports, roads, 
railroads, telecommunications, and airfields.”174 The State Department, sensing its waning 
authority over the economic considerations of the Spanish policy, would later reinsert itself. For 
the time being, this separation of responsibilities served as the modus operandi of the American 
foreign policy establishment until June of 1951. 
Despite this, the State Department still vied for greater responsibility in the negotiating 
process. In early February, just before Ambassador Griffis departed for Spain, Under Secretary 
of State James Webb placed a greater emphasis on the political regards involving NATO allies. 
He also called for more deliberation between the Department of State and the Department of 
Defense concerning the $62.6 million dollars of aid that Congress required President Truman to 
divulge to Spain—which, for one reason or another, remained unspent in the State Department’s 
hands.175 
As of April 1951, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff still 
looked to the State Department for all the requisite clearances in keeping with NSC 72/3. The 
Joint Strategic Plans Committee prepared to designate its Joint Military Survey Team to Spain, 
which would have no negotiating power outside of what had already been put forward in NSC 
72/3. After this team compiled its findings about the military capacities and geography of Spain, 
they would have to wait for the approval of the Secretary of State before the negotiating aspect 
could begin.176 The Joint Chiefs further elucidated the point to Admiral Carney, the commander 
of what would become the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, “These initial 
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discussion should be held on a broad, general level, and should be of an exploratory nature with 
a view toward preparing for more technical discussions to follow. You are not authorized to 
make any commitments during these discussions.”177 In the meantime, they also established the 
International Security Affairs of the Defense Department to determine how it would go about 
dispensing future military aid.178 Since the military planners recognized that they knew very little 
about economic conditions in Spain, they decided to coordinate their activities with the State 
Department to the greatest extent possible.  
On June 7, 1951, Secretary of State Acheson desired to slow down the pace of military 
and economic inquests of Spain and put forward NSC 72/5—again indicated his unwillingness to 
see a Spanish policy through. As the Navy prepared its first delegation under Chief of Naval 
Operations, Forrest Sherman, Secretary Acheson made his demands clear, “All action to develop 
Spain’s military potentialities should be tempered by political considerations.”179 At this point, 
Acheson had abandoned purely ideological reasons as a motivation for hindering the Spanish 
policy, but he only now took an active interest in the other political concerns of the Spanish 
question—a role that was his from the very beginning. Secretary Marshall then called together 
the National Security Council to confirm the previous delineation of responsibilities in NSC 
72/6, which served as the definitive Spanish policy until the Pact of Madrid. In his estimation, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff should, with their Spanish counterparts, immediately begin military 
consultations, exchanges of information, and technical discussions.180  With that, Admiral 
Sherman left with his delegation for Spain on July 16. Two days later, Acheson announced the 
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new policy to the press, taking lengths to distance himself from the military considerations and 
possible political consequences involved with preliminary military talks, “Military authorities are 
in general agreement that Spain is of strategic importance to the general defense of Western 
Europe.”181 Sherman’s mission to Spain, however, was short-lived. Apparently ill before he left, 
Sherman suffered a series of debilitating heart attacks and died in Naples on July 22.182 In his 
stead, the Defense Department designated first Joint Military Survey Team to evaluate the 
Spanish infrastructure. 
The Survey Teams 
 
From the locations of the bases to their subsidiary infrastructure, more than just military 
considerations factored into the decisions of the Defense planners on the ground in Spain. The 
State Department also hoped to lead various aspects of the Spanish policy, but was unable, 
leaving it to the military teams to place all aspects under a single policy. The first Temporary 
Economic Survey Group and the Joint Military Survey Team respectively, arrived in Spain for a 
brief assessment of locations suitable for potential joint Spanish-American military bases in 
1951. Immediately following Sherman’s death, the Joint Military Survey Team under General 
Spry and the Temporary Economic Survey Team under University of Syracuse economist Sidney 
Sufrin left for Spain in August 1951. During the three months in which the survey teams were 
compiling military and economic data in Spain, Congress passed the Mutual Security Act.183 
This act allowed Congress to continue the military component of the European Recovery 
Program after it expired under the newly established Mutual Security Agency. For Spain, this 
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meant $100 million dollars for fiscal year 1952-1953.184 As Sufrin’s Economic Survey Team 
encountered great difficulty in compiling accurate data due to Spanish interference, greater 
responsibility for economic estimates fell to the military planners. Although the two teams toured 
Spain for almost the same amount of time, they produced very different results. 
Secretary Acheson hoped that the findings of the Temporary Economic Survey Team 
would serve as a justification for maintaining the role of the State Department in allotting 
economic aid to Spain. He hoped that Sufrin’s recommendations to his supervising agency the 
European Cooperation Agency would allow the State Department to determine how the $100 
million of the MSA allotment. Sufrin made a series of blunders and more importantly, had great 
difficulty in removing himself from his Spanish hosts.185 He recognized several important flaws 
with the Spanish economy, such as the predominance of corporatist industry through the Instituto 
Nacional de Insdustria, which controlled all of Spain’s largest industries and was modeled after 
the fascist Italian IRI.186 He also took issue with Spain’s variable exchange rates on 
commodities, which he believed deterred from foreign investment. Above all, Sufrin desired 
more economic aid to Spanish agriculture and infrastructure in order to avoid inflation if the 
Spanish government began spending large sums of money on base construction. Yet, on account 
of a lack of access, Sufrin reverted to earlier State Department reports on Spain. Combined with 
some awkward diplomatic moments like when he accidentally hit the Spanish Duke of Alba, 
Sufrin’s report did not serve Acheson’s intended result when Sufrin returned in the autumn of 
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1951.187 Congress had allotted $100 Mutual Security Aid, which could not directly be spent on 
armaments. Since Sufrin and the State Department could not offer an accurate plan, the Mutual 
Security Agency would have to look elsewhere.  
Liedtke mentioned that the State Department was concerned that the Defense Department 
would supplant the diplomatic role of the State Department in Spain, “the State Department ran 
the risk of being swept aside by military considerations during the negotiating process.”188 
Although Acheson’s State Department now desired to take an active role in constructing a 
Spanish policy, the “military men” had already studied the Spanish question in depth and been in 
communication with their Spanish counterparts since 1949. Robert Lovett, Acheson’s protégé 
and former Under Secretary of State for George Marshall, now lead the Defense Department. 
Under his leadership, the military staffs of the Defense Department merged political and military 
considerations in such a way to maintain distance from Franco’s regime while channeling to it 
much needed aid. 
The report compiled the ninety-man Joint Military Survey Team under General Spry 
guided both military and economic aid allotments for the State Department and the Defense 
Department. It would later serve as the document from which American negotiators in Spain 
referred in order to obtain anchorage rights, land claims, and other contractual obligations. Per 
his previous instructions, however, General Spry did not himself come to negotiate, but simply to 
“look around”.189 Expecting to strike a hard-bargain with the Americans, Franco encountered 
negotiators tougher than he expected. In the estimation of Benjamin Welles, one of the first 
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American historians to write on modern Spain under Franco, the JMST caught Franco off-guard, 
“The Spanish, traditional masters of bureaucracy, had finally met their match.”190 
When Spry’s team issued their findings in Washington during in December 1952, the 
extent of American economic and military requirements in Spain required the active participation 
of the State Department to develop a negotiating strategy. On the basis of their findings, the 
JMST determined that the Spanish authorities were willing to permit, and the Spanish 
infrastructure able to support, up to ten wings of fighters and bombers—a detail of around twenty 
thousand airmen.191 A force this large stationed abroad would require a host of support facilities, 
including supply depots, ammunition dumps, adequate roads, and sufficient means of refueling. 
As the Sufrin report indicated, an increase in short-term spending for the military projects would 
bring with it other economic considerations that the State Department would have to address.  
In addition to the basics, the base construction would have a number of tangential effects. 
First, the Spanish central bank would have to establish complete currency convertibility from the 
peseta to the dollar. The servicemen would likely want off-base amenities. Franco did not want 
“little Americas” to spring up as they had in the Rhineland-Palatinate and elsewhere in the 
Federal German Republic where there were American military bases.192 Would rowdy airmen in 
Madrid, Cadiz, Sevilla, or Zaragoza be returned to military justice? Would this include criminal 
acts? The Spaniards would also have to take up their Catholic intolerance of other religious, as 
young couples would potentially desire to marry. In short, the scope of this proposed American 
military presence abroad required a sustained commitment from both Spain and the United States 
cover issues beyond the purview of the military planners alone.    
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The initial report of the Joint Military Survey Team examined the military aspects of the 
Spanish policy, but later in 1952, John Ohly of the Mutual Security Agency expanded the role of 
the Defense Department to include a great share of the economic side as well. He designated the 
lingering $100 million dollar from the Mutual Security appropriation for military use. With this 
added responsibility, the military planners, the Joint Logistics Plans Committee in early 1952 
reported to the Joint Chiefs how various allotment of military aid could satisfy economic 
improvements in Spain. The Spanish rail system, in their estimation was decrepit, “the present 
Spanish rail net is inadequately maintained and cannot support the Spanish economy.”193 They 
decided to set aside, under the auspices of the United States Army, $15 million for their 
revitalization, “which should properly be a priority element of economic aid to Spain.”194 With 
some rebalancing of priorities, the JLPC arranged the railroad revitalization to cost $1.4 million 
dollars while the ECA would cover the rest. Yet, the defense planners waited to announce any 
larger initiatives until the State Department made their recommendations.  They made this point 
clear,  
“Our military requirements in Spain, and the related program of economic, military, and technical 
aid in support of those requirements which the State Department has been requested to coordinate 
and develop, are essential elements in our proposed negotiations with Spain, for which 
negotiations the State Department is also responsible.”195 
 
Ostensibly, it was the responsibility of the Temporary Economic Survey Team to analyze the 
state of Spanish infrastructure from which a greater aid plan could emerge. Without a sound 
basis, the European Cooperation Agency came to rely more on the recommendations of the 
military planners instead of those of the State Department. 
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Before the new year, Secretary Lovett and the Joint Chiefs composed a new group of 
general staff officers to return to Spain, “To take advantage of contacts established by the JMST 
and in order to expedite the conclusion of the desired base rights agreement and a bilateral 
military aid agreement, a Joint U.S. Military Group should be established in Spain as a matter of 
priority.”196 This amounted to, in effect, a hybrid organization that answered to the United States 
Ambassador, but remained beyond his immediate jurisdiction indicating what lengths policy-
makers were willing to go in order pursue national policy. Without much input from the State 
Department, the Joint Chiefs decided it would be best for the Joint United States Military Group: 
Spain under Major General August Kissner to report directly to Ambassador Griffis and his 
successor, the current United States Ambassador to Portugal, Lincoln MacVeagh. The sums 
involved were simply too great without adequate cooperation across the Departments: an 
estimated $330 million for the Air Force; $60 million for naval construction; and $15 million for 
the Army’s roads.197 By February 14, the Mutual Security Agency and the Joint Chiefs decided 
on funding scheme that allowed the Spaniards to fund sixty percent of development projects with 
the peseta while the ECA would cover the remaining forty percent by dollar expenditure.  
As the list of projects continued to grow, the State Department offered little in the way of 
counsel, yet still desired to hold a leading role in the Spanish negotiations. Between the various 
federal subalterns like the European Cooperation Agency, Mutual Security Agency, and Mutual 
Assistance Advisory Committee, and the military planners, a detailed Spanish policy emerged. 
They had already arranged funding sources for “investment projects for economic development”, 
revitalization of the munitions industry, and “commodities provided to offset inflationary impact 
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of peseta investment”.198  They proceeded on a model they believed offered “commodities and 
technical assistance, and stimulation of economic developments which support Spain.”199 Yet 
Acheson took issue with the Joint United States Military Group—which the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
envisioned the negotiators of the Spanish policy, “The proposed terms of reference for the Joint 
U.S. Military Group exceed the limitations of the ‘initial discussions’ approved by the 
President…The program of U.S. facilities desired in Spain at this time should be reviewed to 
determine whether a program of lesser magnitude could be accepted.”200 At this late juncture, 
Acheson still resisted. Yet, the State Department did not furnish any further recommendations to 
the nascent JUSMG, which was scheduled to leave by March 25.  
Although the negotiations were just beginning, it was clear that the military planners of 
the Defense Department came both put forward and enact the Spanish policy because their 
counterparts at the State Department were unable. A hybrid negotiating team comprised of 
military men—the Joint US Military Group—working under the American Ambassador with the 
aid of some smaller federal offices that managed foreign aid resolved the Spanish question. 
Liedkte pointed out some of Kissner’s error during the negotiating process—some of them 
costly. When Kissner indicated to his Spanish counterpart, General Vigón, that the United States 
may be willing to finance military upgrades, the Spaniards pushed for it.201 Since it was precisely 
this political concern that the American negotiators wanted to avoid. The military aid Spain 
would receive did not come from the same sources that guaranteed other Western European 
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recipients “end-product” military items—such as advanced weapons systems.202 These nations 
feared their share of American military technology would decrease should Spain receive it. With 
NATO recovering from the shock of the Korean War, any other irregularities would strain the 
alliance if not break it outright. The talks stalled throughout 1953 and were nearing denouement. 
At last in early August, the American negotiators dangled $125 million of aid for the Spanish 
military instead of the previous $15 million, which Franco readily accepted.203 At this point in 
the process, these constituted political errors rather than an elevation of military interests over 
political ones. The political authority had left the Spanish policy to chance. Their subalterns and 
the Defense planners desired the opposite. The military planners had invested two years in 
forming a Spanish policy while the State Department, in large part, chided them from their self-
imposed stint on the sidelines.  
 
Section V: Epilogue 
 
The headline of the conservative Spanish weekly ABC for the week of September 27, 
1953 stated what every Spaniard, by this point, already knew—“to reinforce the preparation of 
the West in the safe-keeping of the Peace”—the resumption of close Spanish-American relations 
began.204 The afternoon before, the current United States Ambassador to Spain, James Dunn 
signed the finalized Pact of Madrid along with the Spanish Foreign Minister in Madrid. As the 
anonymous writers for ABC recognized, Spain finally could assume its place among the Western 
nations in the global struggle against Communism. Yet they could not disguise their most 
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pressing interests even on the front page, “Spain will receive economic, technical, and military 
help.”205 Spain’s darker days were over. To mark his influence during this important turn of 
events, Senator McCarran also made a headline in the same issue, “Mac Carran expresses his 
satisfaction and says that the signed accords ought to last many years.”206 Earlier that summer, 
McCarran received the Grand Cross of the Order of Isabella la Catolica—one of Spain’s highest 
honors—in light of his contributions to Spanish-American relations.207  Yet the Spaniards were 
more concerned with the American trains, trucks, and their mechanics who would arrive in the 
coming year to serve as technical advisers.  
Despite some of the logistical concerns on the part of the planners, they came to accept 
locations for a total of four large bases in Spain. These four bases lay along a diagonal nearly 
five hundred miles long running northeast from Cadiz on the Atlantic to Zaragoza in the Ebro 
River basin. To connect them all, the JUSMG recommended that an oil pipeline be constructed 
along the corridor of least distance. They ruled out other areas with as much strategic value, such 
as the Atlantic port of El Ferrol, for reasons that remain ambiguous from the documents. Yet all 
the bases were to be located next to important urban centers. Zaragoza was the fifth largest city 
in Spain and would be the home of the Sanjurjo-Valenzuela air complex.208 The site of the 
Torrejón base stood within the city limits of Spain’s capital and largest city, Madrid. The 
southern air base would be located at Morón, just thirty kilometers southeast of Spain’s third 
largest city, Sevilla. The Rota naval base, future anchorage for the nuclear submarines of the US 
6th Fleet, would be located across the bay from Cádiz, one of Spain’s most important maritime 
centers and the same port from which Columbus set sail in 1492. 
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From Arthur Whittaker. Spain and the Defense of the West. (Published for the Council on Foreign 
Relations, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961) inlay. 
 
During the years of the Spanish question, 1945-1953, the political, military, and 
economic needs of the United States changed greatly. As such, the nation required a foreign 
policy that reflected this. Yet the inability of the American diplomatic corps to execute this 
policy led to a strange scenario where military men became diplomats. As such, no 
predominance of one group of interests over another emerged. Rather, the hybrid civil-military 
negotiating teams represented the outward expression of the American policy on Spain. 
From 1945 to 1949, the foreign policy establishment did not address the Spanish question 
as the future war scenarios of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed its strategic importance. Rather, a 
combination of personal disputes between the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State 
hindered any progress. Although the Secretary of State presented valid political concerns 
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regarding the reaction of America’s European allies to Spanish integration, but narrowly 
constructed ideological arguments usually ended further debate on the issue. 
In Congress, the Spanish Lobby presented the Spanish question on its political, 
economic, and military merits. Carlton Hayes began the effort. Although they frequently 
experienced setbacks, their leader, Senator McCarran was able to win over a third of the senate 
to the Spanish cause before the outbreak of war in Korea. Immediately afterward, another third 
voted with the Spanish Lobby.  
Through his Congressional maneuvering, McCarran forced President Truman to spend at 
least $63.5 million in Spanish aid. As the United States bestowed foreign aid to Tito’s 
Yugoslavia, a humanitarian crisis loomed in Spain, and Truman uttered disparaging remarks 
about Franco in the American press, even ideological justifications for Spanish exclusion rung 
hollow. Following further attempts of the Spanish Lobby and the recommendations of the most-
trusted minds of the foreign policy establishment, President Truman finally acceded a military 
solution to the Spanish question. By doing this, Truman dodged criticisms from American allies 
while offering more security to Western Europe.  
During a span of three years from 1949 to 1952, the various policy and military planning 
groups of the Department of Defense adapted to the changing course of the Cold War. After 
national political leaders agreed that military interests should play a greater role in national 
security policy, they rushed headlong into investing negotiating authority to the 
interdepartmental committees, a large component of which was comprised of planners from the 
Defense Department. This about-face was abrupt. Yet the Joint Strategic Plans Committee 
required a series of ad hoc Survey Groups and Economic teams to fully develop their policy on 
political terms. They would also periodically consult the State Department for expertise should 
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they find it in short supply. This did not result in military considerations supplanting political 
ones, for the Defense Department incorporated various new methods of constructing policy into 
its structure—thereby establishing a modus operandi for future endeavors.   
It is a rather simple question: which should take precedence—military or political 
considerations? The answer Clausewitz provides is simple enough; political considerations must 
lead other concerns when crafting a military policy. Under different circumstances, the political 
and military may complement one another, but this takes coordination and discipline across a 
bureaucracy, “But if policy judges correctly of the march of military events, it is entirely its 
affair to determine what are the events and what direction of events most favourable to the 
ultimate and great end of the War.”209 This was the case in the events leading to the Pact of 
Madrid in 1953. 
Perhaps the transition to peacetime bureaucracies—and the scaling back of the Defense 
Department—followed by its sudden resurgence during the Korean War revealed that the United 
States required a war-oriented diplomacy to meet the contours of the Cold War. The Spanish 
case reveals some important insights on these questions, but not completely. What is certain is 
that, in the Spanish negotiations, a full subordination of political to military requirements did not 
occur. Rather, the military and the political eventually converged. If critics assert that Clausewitz 
does not apply to the modern age, they need examine the integration of Spain as an example. 
This thesis examined what consequences administrative departures from established diplomatic 
principles may have on the ability of a nation to conduct its diplomacy and how the diplomatic 
needs of a nation will somehow be met. If the military aspect is ignored, it must eventually be 
addressed, and most likely on less than desirable terms.  
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